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INTRODUCTION: THE HONORÉ-WALDRON THESIS

In his seminal essay on the nature of ownership and its “standard
incidents” or “bundle of rights,”1 A.M. Honoré made two significant
points concerning the place of property in different politico-economic
systems of government. First, Honoré noted, it is patently false to
claim that all systems attach an equal importance to ownership (in the
full, liberal sense) . . . . In the Soviet Union [still extant in 1961], for
instance, important assets such as land, businesses and collective farms
are in general withdrawn from ‘personal ownership’ (viz. the liberal
type of ownership) and subjected to ‘government’ or ‘collective’
2
ownership, which is a different, though related institution.

And, second, that
in nearly all systems there will be some things to which not all the
standard incidents apply, some things which cannot be sold or left by
will, some interests which cannot endure beyond a lifetime, some things
. . . which it is forbidden to use or to use in certain ways. If the
differences between these cases and the paradigm case are striking
enough, we shall be tempted to say that the things in question are not or
cannot be owned, but it would be a mistake to conclude that the legal
systems in which these cases occur do not recognize ownership.
Whether a system recognizes ownership, and to what extent it permits
ownership (who may own, what may be owned), are widely differing
3
questions.

Of course, in using “full liberal ownership,” or simply “personal
ownership,” Honoré was moving toward an analytical description of
that which would only later become described and readily recognized
as “private property,” comprising both full ownership and some
parcelling of a smaller bundle of those rights which together might
constitute full ownership held by an individual private person. For
1.
See LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER
11-15 (2003); JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 9-13 (1988); Francis S.
Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 691, 694 (1938).
2.
A.M Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE: A
COLLABORATIVE WORK 107, 109 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961).
Id. at 109-10.
3.
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Honoré, this “personal ownership” stood in contrast to that form of
ownership which attaches to the state or the public, or to the
community, or to some defined group drawn from the members of a
wider community or of the state.4 Again, Honoré was describing
analytically that which would only later become recognized as “state
or public property” and “common property.”
Yet it would be some time in coming. Honoré wrote in 1961,
and even as recently as 1996, J.W. Harris, in his own seminal work
Property and Justice, could write that property theorists “have seldom
attempted any analysis of modern property institutions which exhibits
that which unites, and that which divides, these differing conceptions
of property—in particular, what precisely is the difference between
‘ownership’ when ascribed to private persons or groups or to agencies
discharging public functions.”5
Harris does, however, go some way toward providing a
thoroughgoing analytical account of the three theoretical ideal types
of property to which he alludes, as well as adding a fourth category.
Those categories are: (1) private property, whether held by individuals,
jointly by more than one individual or group, or by a corporation;
(2) public/state property; (3) common property; and (4) a category
created by Harris, which he called “communitarian property” to
describe the increasingly important form of property for many
postcolonial nations, variously known as native, aboriginal, or
indigenous title.6
These ideal-typic categories of property add precision to what
Honoré revealed only in an amorphous way, and doing so allows a
better understanding of what Honoré meant in answering the dual
question of who may own and what may be owned in liberal-capitalist
(largely common law) and communist-socialist (largely civil law)
legal systems:
No doubt liberal societies are more inclined than socialist societies to
extend the list of items that can be owned, but it does not follow that,
when a socialist system permits ownership, or ‘personal ownership’ [in
other words, private property], it is permitting something different from
what is permitted in the corresponding case in a liberal society. It may
well be—and all the evidence indeed supports the view—that socialist
societies recognize the ‘liberal’ notion of ‘full’ ownership [in other
4.
5.
6.

Id. at 110.
J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 100 (1996).

Id. at 100-18.
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words private property], but limit the range of things that can be
7
owned.

In other words, Honoré makes a point seldom grasped when we think
of property today: every legal system, no matter its politicoeconomic-legal genesis, contains a mix of each of the four ideal types
identified initially by him in 1961 and later sharpened by Harris. It is
a matter of the mix of these types, and not the presence or absence of
any of them, on which we ought to focus. Jeremy Waldron puts it this
way:
Property rules differ from society to society. Though we describe some
societies (like the United States) as having systems of private property,
and others (like China) as having collectivist systems, all societies have
some places governed by private property rules, some places governed
by state property rules, and some places governed by common property
rules. Every society has private houses, military bases, and public
parks. So if we want to categorize whole societies along these lines, we
have to say it is a matter of balance and emphasis. For example, we say
that China is a collectivist society and that the United States is not, not
because there is no private property in China, but because most
industrial and agricultural land there is held collectively whereas most
industrial and agricultural land in America is privately owned. The
distinction is one of degree. Even as between two countries [that] have
basically capitalist economies, New Zealand (say) and Britain, we may
say that the former is “communist” to a greater extent (that is, is more a
system of common property) than the latter because more places (for
example, all river banks) are held as common property in New Zealand
8
than are held as common property in Britain.

Waldron identifies something alluded to by both Honoré and Harris:
the true difference between systems is not one of the presence or
absence of any one or more than one ideal-typic form of property, but
one of the degree to which those types of property are found in each
system. In other words, no system has a complete absence of any one
type of property but, rather, a blend, the only difference being one of
degree.

Honoré, supra note 2, at 110.
Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, in LIBERAL RIGHTS:
COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-1991 309, 312-13 (1993); see also Michael A. Heller, Critical
Approaches to Property Institutions: Three Faces of Private Property, 79 OR. L. REV. 417, 421
(2000) (noting that property theorists always recognize that any actual property regime should
and will contain all elements of the trilogy of private, common, and state property).
7.
8.
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In this Article, we call the identification of this mix, balance, or
blend, in varying degrees of ideal-typic property types identified in
varying stages of specificity by Honoré and Waldron, the “HonoréWaldron thesis.” And in this Article, we test the accuracy of the thesis
by considering, comparatively, the real property or land law of a
communist/socialist and civilian legal system, that of China, and two
liberal/capitalist and common law systems, those of the United States
and Australia.
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part II briefly describes the
principal features of each of the four ideal-typic categories of property.
Parts III through V examine, respectively, the real property law of the
United States, Australia, and China, demonstrating examples of each
of the four ideal-typic categories, in varying mixes of ideal-types
found in representatives of the two main legal traditions (common and
civil). In order to test the thesis, the three jurisdictions are organized
here according to the extent to which most people intuitively consider
one of the ideal-types to predominate. Thus, the United States is dealt
with first, as an example of a common law system in which private
property is thought by most people to be the dominant ideal-typic
form of property. We then deal with Australia, in recognition of the
fact that a reader who is familiar with Australia (also a common law
system) will typically think it is more like the United States and less
like China in terms of the mix of ideal-typic categories, although not
exactly like either one of those other jurisdictions. And China
represents a civilian system in which most people would think that
public or state property comprises the largest category.
The intuitive sense that people have of each system is the point
of the Honoré-Waldron thesis—what we think is the case may not be
and likely is not necessarily so. Thus, this Article reveals the truth of
the thesis: none of the three systems we examine reveals a complete
absence of any one ideal-typic form of property. Rather, as the thesis
predicts, each exhibits a blend of the three ideal-typic forms. It is a
difference of degree.
Part VI offers some comparative reflections on the nature of the
mix of ideal types in each of the three legal systems examined and
how the Honoré-Waldron thesis confirms Honoré’s assessment of
property made over half a century ago. Indeed, what emerges is a
continuum of property systems, based upon intuitive understandings
of the mix of property types. The continuum ranges from those
property systems in which we have an intuitive sense that private
property predominates to those in which we have an intuitive sense
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that state or public property predominates. What we find is that, in
actuality, at neither end of the continuum is there a complete absence
of any of the ideal types of property. Or, put another way, this
assessment of the Chinese, American, and Australian land law
systems confirms, apart from providing a working outline of each of
those systems, the truth of the Honoré-Waldron thesis. There is,
indeed, a mix, balance, or blend of each of the four ideal-typic
categories of property found in these jurisdictions. This conclusion is
significant, for it means that the land law, and indeed any aspect of the
property law, of any jurisdiction can just as easily be plotted along the
continuum which we present here.
II.

IDEAL-TYPIC CATEGORIES

Before we consider the three land law systems which form the
basis of our test of the Honoré-Waldron thesis, it is necessary to
provide a brief outline of the four ideal-typic categories identified by
Harris. This allows us accurately to classify the types of property in
land in each of the three systems. As we know, the ideal-typic
categories identified by Harris are private property, common
property, state/public property, and communitarian property. This
Part considers each in turn.

A. Private Property
Let us consider what private property is by splitting the phrase
into its two parts: “private” and “property.” It is easier to take
“property” first. The modern liberal conception of property consists
of an Honoré-inspired “bundle” of legal rights or relations created for
and conferred upon individuals, or groups of them, and enforced by
the state between those individuals, or groups of them, in relation to
the control of goods and resources.9 Today this is known as the
“Hohfeld-Honoré bundle of rights” picture of property,10 “the bundle

9.
For various accounts of the liberal conception of private property, see STEPHEN R.
MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 166-69 (1990); MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING
PROPERTY 31-33 (1993); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF
PROPERTY 2-6 (2000); WALDRON, supra note 1, at 9-13.
10. See LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 11-14,
21-22 (1977); MUNZER, supra note 9, at 17-27; Gerald F. Gaus, Property, Rights, and
Freedom, in PROPERTY RIGHTS 209, 212-18 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1994).
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of rights picture of property,”11 or simply “the sophisticated or legal
conception of [private] property.”12
At a minimum, this bundle includes the “liberal triad” of use,
exclusivity, and disposition.13 With few exceptions, one can use or
dispose of any “tangible or intangible good, resource, or item of social
wealth . . . to the exclusion of all others.”14 And the holder may
exercise these rights in any way they see fit, to suit personal
preferences and desires or, simply, to act in a self-seeking way.15 Or,
to put this in a way that comports more closely with the language of
liberal theory, rights are the shorthand way of saying that individuals
enjoy choice, the ability to “set agendas”16 about the control and use of
goods and resources in accordance with and to give meaning to a
chosen life project. Of course, in addition to protecting the rights
themselves and their exercise against interference from others or from
government, those very laws may also impose limits on selfseekingness.17
11. See J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV.
711, 715 (1996).
12. Id. at 724 (quoting MUNZER, supra note 9, at 23).
13. RADIN, supra note 9, at 121-23. This builds, of course, upon the ground-breaking
work of Honoré, who identified eleven “standard incidents” of ownership. On whether there
are essential incidents, see Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right To Exclude, 77 NEB. L.
REV. 730 (1998). On antiessentialism, see Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property,
in 22 NOMOS: PROPERTY 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) and Lior
Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights To Exclude, 104 MICH. L. REV.
1835 (2006).
14. Paul Babie, Climate Change: Government, Private Property, and Individual
Action, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, Winter 2011, at 19.
15. This begins with John Stuart Mill’s “self-regarding act.” JOHN STUART MILL, ON
LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 88-98 (The MacMillan Company 1926) (1859); see also
HARRIS, supra note 5, at 29, 31, 105; MUNZER, supra note 9, at 3-9; JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER,
THE EDGES OF THE FIELD: LESSONS ON THE OBLIGATIONS OF OWNERSHIP 66-70 (2000)
(outlining how property norms assist in determining the difference between a truly selfregarding act and one that is not); SINGER, supra note 9, at 30; Gregory S. Alexander,
Property as Propriety, 77 NEB. L. REV. 667, 699 (1998). For the modern work on selfregarding acts, see Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical
Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 975.
16. This phrase was coined by Larissa Katz. Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity
in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275 (2008).
17. This is because there has yet to be any example in the history of human society
where “sole and despotic dominion” described the on-the-ground distribution of resources or
social wealth. Blackstone himself recognized this. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*2; see Frederick G. Whelan, Property as Artifice: Hume and Blackstone, in 22 NOMOS:
PROPERTY, supra note 13, at 101, 114-25. For more contemporary critiques, see Heller, supra
note 8, at 419 and Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108
YALE L.J. 601, 620-31 (1998). Even the Romans—to whom the notion of absolute dominium
in things is often attributed—did not in practice recognize such a possibility. Joshua Getzler,
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Modern scholarship reminds us that it is important to see these
rights as legal relations. This is significant because it adds both a
social dimension to property and explains that property can only exist
as a product of relationship between and among individuals. Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld first brought this to our attention in the notion of
“jural opposites,” which, at the risk of drastic oversimplification,
means that where there is a right (choice) to do something, there is a
corresponding duty (a lack of choice) to refrain from interfering with
the interest protected by the right. 18 Rights would clearly be
meaningless if this were not so. The liberal individual therefore holds
choice, the ability to set an agenda about a good or resource, while all
others (individuals and the community or society)19 are burdened with
a lack of choice.
Having described “property,” we must remember that we are
concerned with “private” property. What, then, is meant by “private?”
C.B. Macpherson captures the meaning of “private” by noting that it
“had to be based on the individual: property could only be seen as a
right of an individual, a right derivable from his human essence, a
right to some use or benefit of something without the use or benefit of
which he could not be fully human.”20 J.W. Harris adds that “private”
means that situation where the rights which constitute property are
held by individuals, jointly by more than one individual or group, or
by a corporation.21 And C. Edwin Baker summarizes the combination
of “private” and “property” this way: “[Private] property [i]s a claim
that other people ought to accede to the will of the owner, which can
be a person, a group, or some other entity. A specific property right
amounts to the decisionmaking authority of the holder of that right.”22
Roman Ideas of Landownership, in LAND LAW: THEMES

AND PERSPECTIVES 81, 81-106
(Susan Bright & John Dewar eds., 1998).
18. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28-31 (1913-1914); Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J.
710, 710-13 (1917).
19. On the meaning of community and society as concerns property theory, see
PROPERTY AND COMMUNITY (Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver eds., 2010).
20. C.B. Macpherson, Liberal-Democracy and Property, in PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM
AND CRITICAL POSITIONS 199, 201-02 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1978).
21. HARRIS, supra note 5, at 101-02; Thomas Hill Green, The Right of the State in
Regard to Property, in PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS, supra note 20, at
101-17.
22. C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty,
134 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 742-43 (1986) (emphasis added).
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In this web of legal relationships, which instantiates the rights
that comprise it and which defines its holder as the individual, a group
of individuals, or legal individuals, especially corporations, we
therefore find the liberal conception of private property.

B.

Common Property

As we know from Honoré’s and Harris’s work, we must add to
private property two other ideal-typic categories of property—
common and state/public23—as well as the boundaries between the
three.24 While it does exist in real-world societies,25 true common
property is very rare—the atmosphere, for instance, is the primary
example, which might be contrasted with the public domain of
intellectual property. Rather than describing any real world place,
common property typically serves as a residual theoretical category
necessary to describe any property regime that is neither private nor
state/public.26 It is a hypothetical postulate for a theory that attempts
to demonstrate, conceptually and logically, 27 the emergence and
ongoing existence of private property in any society.28 In other words,
it is the method of resource allocation in a society where it cannot be
said that private or state/public property exists, whatever content those
categories may have for that society.
As a matter of content then, common property is the absence of
any exclusionary rights; instead, everyone has the privilege and no
one has the right to exclude others in relation to the resource or thing
in question. Frank Michelman argues that in the commons, “[p]eople
are legally free to do as they wish, and are able to do, with whatever
objects (conceivably including persons) are in the [commons].”29 In
23. The “ideal-typic” and “ideal types” phraseology was coined by Heller. See
Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1200 (1999);
Heller, supra note 8, at 418-22.
24. See Heller, supra note 23, at 1169.
25. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1322-28 (1993);
Heller, supra note 8, at 420-21.
26. HARRIS, supra note 5, at 110; Heller, supra note 8, at 419.
27. HARRIS, supra note 5, at 111-14.
28. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 17, at *2-8; JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 327-44 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690); WALDRON,
supra note 1, at 277-78; Heller, supra note 8, at 420; Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling:
Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
37, 52 (1990).
29. Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, in 24
NOMOS: ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 3, 5 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman
eds., 1982).
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other words, in the commons, the protections afforded private or
state/public property have not been extended to the resource in
question.30

C.

State/Public Property

While many examples of state/public property (sometimes also
called collective property31) can be found in existing societies,32 it can
also, like common property, represent a theoretical counterpostulate to
private property. It exists where “the collective, represented usually
by the state, holds all rights of exclusion and is the sole locus of
decision-making regarding use of resources.” 33 Thus, drawing
parasitically upon private property, this ideal-type confers bundles of
rights on agents of the state or other public officials in relation to
certain assets or resources.
The major theoretical distinction between state/public and
private property is the fact that unlike the latter, in the case of the
former, no legitimate, self-seeking, preference-satisfying, or selfregarding exploitation is allowed. Rather, any use is governed by the
conceptions of social function according to the public enterprise in
question, typically by legislative means.34

D.

Communitarian Property

J.W. Harris, as noted above, added a fourth ideal-typic form of
property: communitarian.35 Distinguishable from private and state/
public, communitarian property, not to be confused with common
property, is that form of property which belongs to an indigenous
people, yet depends for its existence upon the recognition and
protection of a dominant legal system. Still, while the dominant legal
system recognises and protects it, communitarian property does not
depend upon that external protection or upon any conception of
private property or public property for its content. That content must
come from the unique rules, traditions, and customs of the indigenous
people in question, which always differentiate this type of property
from private and public. Indeed, any external protection provided by
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

HARRIS, supra note 5, at 107-10.
Heller, supra note 8, at 420.
MUNZER, supra note 9, at 25.
Heller, supra note 8, at 421.
HARRIS, supra note 5, at 105.
See supra text accompanying note 6.
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the dominant system must stop short of internal regulation;
interference by a dominant society and its legal system irreversibly
alters the distinction between communitarian property and public and
private property.36
External protection, therefore, is not sufficient for the existence
of communitarian property. There must also exist an internal content
which derives from a mutual sense of community; that content is the
subject of the protection offered by the dominant legal system. Where
members of a community have mutual rights over land which they
claim as theirs, referable exclusively to their own traditions and
customs but protected by external rules conferred by a dominant legal
system, communitarian property exists.37
With these theoretical distinctions in place, it is possible now to
turn to the working land law or real property law systems in the three
jurisdictions chosen to test the Honoré-Waldron thesis. As we
explained in the Introduction, the three systems are organized
according to the intuitive understanding of the ideal-typic categories
of property normally associated with them: in the case of the United
States, private property; in the case of China, state/public property;
and in the case of Australia, something in between.
III. REAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
Prior to European contact, the area within the present boundaries
of the United States was occupied by indigenous peoples. Beginning
in the late fifteenth century, European nations, operating on their own
legal and cultural premises, claimed sovereign ownership of the land,
to the exclusion of the natives. While European settlers in the future
United States were not exclusively English, English common law
became the predominant legal system in the colonial period.38 The
real property law of most states remains a variation of English land
law as it was at the time of American independence in the late 18th
century, 39 although the state of Louisiana, formed out of land

36.
37.
38.

HARRIS, supra note 5, at 102-04.

Id.

For colonial land law, see 1 DAVID A. THOMAS, HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAND LAW:
ENGLISH ORIGINS AND THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE ch. 9-11 (2013).
39. For a state-by-state survey of the reception of the English common law of
property, see 2 DAVID A. THOMAS, HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAND LAW: LAND LAW IN THE
AMERICAN STATES ch. 12-14 (2013).
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purchased from France in 1803, retains a civil law property system,40
and the property law of some western states includes civil law
elements, particularly community property for married persons. 41
Although reference is sometimes made to an “American law of
property,”42 in fact there is no single body of real property law in the
United States, but instead distinct, although related, state systems.

A. Private: The American Fee Simple
The modern history of American land law begins with the
Declaration of Independence by thirteen British colonies in 1776, an
independence formally recognized by the former colonial power in the
Treaty of Paris in 1783.43 In one form or another, all the newly
independent states declared that sovereignty had passed from the
Crown to the people. The North Carolina Constitution of 1776, for
example, begins with an affirmation of the first principle of
republican government: “That all political power is vested in and
derived from the people only.”44 In consequence, “The property of the
soil . . . being one of the essential rights of the collective body of the
people . . . . all the territories, seas, waters, and harbours, with their
appurtenances . . . are the right and property of the people of this State,
to be held by them in sovereignty,” albeit with a proviso saving Indian
“hunting grounds.”45 Notwithstanding the people’s newly acquired
sovereignty, the state’s first constitution affirmed titles granted in the
colonial period, excepting only property forfeited by those who
remained loyal to the Crown.46 Land not privately owned belonged to
the state, which sought to provide for an orderly sale, although
40. See LA. CIV. CODE bk. II (discussing “Things and the Different Modifications of
Ownership”).
41. The nine community property states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana,
Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. Two other states, Alaska and
Tennessee, offer a community property option. See WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR. & CYNTHIA A.
SAMUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES (6th ed. 2004).
42. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN THE
UNITED STATES (A. James Casner ed., 1952).
43. This treaty was ratified by the U.S. Congress on January 14, 1784. Continental
Congress, 1774-1781, OFF. HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1776-1783/
continentalcongress (last visited Jan. 28, 2017); Continental Congress Ratifies the Treaty of
Paris, HIST., www.history.com/this-day-in-history/ContinentalCongress-ratifies-the-treaty-ofParis (last visited Jan. 28, 2017).
44. N.C. CONST. of 1776, A Declaration of Rights, art. I.
45. Id. art. XXV.
46. Michael Toomey, State of Franklin, N.C. HIST. PROJECT, http://northcarolina
history.org/encyclopedia/state-of-franklin/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2017).
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western settlement was sometimes a scramble.47 Today the State of
North Carolina retains title to less than 7% of the land.48
In keeping with contemporary English practice, land law was
based in theory on a form of “legal feudalism,” a system of tenures
without private allodial title. The basis of the property system was the
estate (technically a tenancy)49 in fee simple, a property interest of
potentially indefinite duration that was alienable, devisable, and
inheritable. 50 Despite the theory, Americans developed a robust
culture of private ownership of land, often associating private property
and free markets with liberty and democracy.51 About two-thirds of
American land is privately owned, although the percentage is higher
in the eastern states.52 The only significant remnant of feudal theory is
escheat on the death of a sole owner without a valid will or qualified
heir. In the event of escheat, title reverts to the sovereign or
“overlord”—in the American system of federalism, the state where
the land is located rather than the federal government.53 Whether as
an aspect of tenure or as an inherent element of sovereignty, the power
of eminent domain allows the state or federal government to take

47. Id.
48. See Public Land Ownership by State, NAT. RESOURCES COUNCIL ME., http://
www.nrcm.org/documents/publiclandownership.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2017).
49. See A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 88-89 (2d ed. 1986) (“[T]he
medieval lawyers never spoke of a person owning an estate in lands. . . . Freeholders are all
tenants.”).
50. See John V. Orth, After the Revolution: “Reform” of the Law of Inheritance, 10
LAW & HIST. REV. 33, 39-43 (1992). After independence, American states acted to replace
primogeniture, favoring the first-born male, with partible inheritance, treating all children
equally. Id. at 34-36. In premodern times, a limited fee existed as well, the fee tail,
inheritable only by bodily heirs. Id. at 36-37. American states have struggled over the years
to eliminate or modify the entailed estate, generally converting it into a fee simple. See, e.g.,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-1 (2016) (“Every person seized of an estate in tail shall be deemed to be
seized of the same in fee simple.”). The State of Connecticut adopted a similar statute in
2015. 2015 Conn. Acts 234. Prior Connecticut law recognized a fee simple in the issue of
the grantee of a fee tail, in effect preserving the entail for one generation. For a survey of the
varieties of state responses to the fee tail, see RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY:
INTRODUCTION AND FREEHOLD ESTATES ch. 5 (AM. LAW INST. 1936).
51. See generally JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 154-55 (2d ed. 1998) (tracing the history of
private ownership and property law in America).
52. See Public Land Ownership by State, supra note 48.
53. William R. Vance, The Quest for Tenure in the United States, 33 YALE L.J. 248,
248-49 (1923-1924). There is “no escheat to the original grantor, even though such grantor
[was] the Federal government, but only to the State in which the land lies.” Id. at 248.
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private property for public use, subject to a constitutional guarantee of
just compensation.54
The unencumbered fee simple held in severalty by a sole
proprietor, while the paradigm form of property ownership, is rarely
encountered in practice. Instead, the fee is often held in concurrent
ownership, whether by spouses, siblings, or coventurers.55 The
traditional array of concurrent estates, originally recognized in most
states, included the tenancy in common, the joint tenancy, and the
tenancy by the entirety.56 The tenancy in common, whereby each coowner holds a separate although undivided share, remains generally
available today. 57 The joint tenancy with its associated right of
survivorship, once the favored form of co-ownership, has been
significantly modified in many states.58 The tenancy by the entirety,
limited to married persons, continues to exist in about half the states.59
In those where it survives, it provides important benefits to spouses in
the form of an indestructible right of survivorship and in some states
significant protection from creditors; in consequence, it was caught
up in the recent marriage equality debate.60
In time, increasing amounts of property were held by
combinations organized in the form of trusts or corporations.61 Where
property is transferred in trust, the title is divided into legal title held
by the trustee and equitable title held by the beneficiaries.62 The
trustee holds all the legal incidents of ownership but must exercise
them exclusively for the benefit of the equitable owners. 63 A
corporation, by contrast, is itself a legal entity, a “fictitious person,”
54. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”). State constitutions are to the same effect. See, e.g., N.J. CONST.
art. I, ¶ 20.
55. 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 32 (David A. Thomas ed., 1994 & Supp.
2011).
56. For a summary of the law of concurrent estates, see id.
57. See id. § 32.05.
58. See id. § 31.05.
59. See id. § 33.
60. Prior to Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding that there is a
federal constitutional right to state recognition of same-sex marriage), state courts had begun
to find the ban on same-sex marriage unconstitutional because, among other things, it denied
such couples the protections afforded by tenancies by the entirety. See Lewis v. Harris, 908
A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
61. See Wayne D. Collins, Trusts and the Origins of Antitrust Legislation, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 2279, 2309, 2315-30 (2013).
62. See Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law as Fiduciary Governance Plus Asset
Partitioning, in THE WORLDS OF THE TRUST 428, 448 (Lionel Smith ed., 2013).
63. Id. at 429.
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capable of holding full title to property, legal and equitable, although
the corporation itself is owned by its shareholders; corporate officers,
like trustees, are accountable to the owners.64
In addition to sharing title among co-owners, splitting it between
trustees and beneficiaries, and vesting it in corporations, the fee can
be divided temporally into present and future interests, such as life
estates and remainders or reversions.65 Life tenants enjoy all the rights
of owners, limited to the term of their lives.66 Owners of so-called
future interests after life estates actually have present rights to future
enjoyment, enabling them to hold life tenants accountable for waste,
that is, lasting damage to the property.67
The fee can also be parceled into leaseholds or burdened with
lesser interests, such as easements, covenants, and servitudes. 68
Leases, which are actually grants of time-limited interests in property,
usually in return for periodic payments of rent, give tenants the rights
of ownership for the duration of the term, but like life tenants, tenants
for a term are liable to the landlord, owner of the reversion after the
lease, for waste.69 Easements are nonpossessory interests, allowing
easement owners the rights of use, such as passage over the burdened
estates.70 Covenants also burden land, usually limiting its use in favor
of covenantees or their successors, while servitudes similarly restrict
use, often imposing affirmative duties of maintenance to a certain
standard on the present owners of the servient estates.71
Land may be pledged (mortgaged) by its owner as security for
the repayment of debt.72 The traditional mortgage is in form a transfer
of title defeasible upon repayment. Despite the transfer, the
mortgagor (the borrower) remains in possession—the historical
explanation of the name mortgage, or “dead pledge,” as opposed to a
64.
65.

Id. at 435.

Roger W. Andersen, Present and Future Interests: A Graphic Explanation, 19
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 101, 101-14 (1995). The fee simple can also be made defeasible, either
limited to terminate automatically on the occurrence or failure of a stated event (fee simple
determinable and fee simple subject to executory limitation) or terminable by one with the
right of reentry on the occurrence or failure of a certain condition (fee simple subject to
condition subsequent and fee simple subject to executory limitation). Id.
66. Id. at 110-11.
67. Id. at 103-04.
68. See ROBERT KRATOVIL, REAL ESTATE LAW (6th ed. 1974).
69. Id. at 412-13, 433.
70. Id. at 404-05.
71. Id. at 407.
72. Id. at 232.
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form of hypothecation (pawn) in which possession is held by the
lender until repayment.73 While the form of the transaction remains a
transfer of title in many of the older, eastern states, the reality is now
more candidly acknowledged in many western states to be a lien to
secure repayment.74
There is also a vertical dimension to land ownership. Although
it was once confidently asserted that the surface owner’s title included
all the space above ground without limit—Cujus est solum, ejus est
usque ad coelum75—it is now recognized that the navigable airspace
beyond “the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere” is a
public highway.76 Within the owner’s airspace, intrusion by airplanes
approaching the ground—or, today, drones—qualifies as entering
private property. Below ground, the surface owner’s title still extends
downwards to an indefinite extent and includes title to deposits of
solid minerals. But ownership in both directions may be divided. The
surface owner may grant avigational easements authorizing flight
through the “immediate reaches” above ground; similarly, the surface
owner may sever the underground mineral estate.77
Today, extensive regulations of land use by law, most notably
zoning ordinances, further restrict a property owner’s rights—for
example, limiting use to residential or commercial purposes. Private
arrangements, not only easements, covenants, and servitudes, but also
newly recognized interests such as conservation and historic
preservation easements, enforceable by organizations or individuals
without regard to privity of estate, blur the distinction between public
and private land use control.
Novel forms of property ownership continue to develop.
Cooperative apartment buildings are owned by the residents to whom
the apartments are leased.78 Condominiums provide for individual
ownership of dwelling units coupled with ownership by all residents
of common areas. 79 Timesharing, usually of vacation property,

73. Id. at 255-56.
74. Id. at 235.
75. HERBERT BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS, CLASSIFIED AND ILLUSTRATED
395-96 (8th ed. 1882).
76. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946).
77. Id. at 259, 265.
78. David T. Engle, Comment, Legal Challenges to Time Sharing Ownership, 45 MO.
L. REV. 423, 424 n.3 (1980).
79. Id. at 425 n.11.
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involves joint ownership by multiple persons who take turns
occupying the premises.80
While most private titles to land are derived from prior owners
by conveyance inter vivos or testamentary, or by inheritance, titles
acquired by adverse possession—original titles—are also recognized.
The requirements vary from state to state, but generally include long
continued possession under a claim of right. 81 Today the most
common incidence of title by adverse possession is in settling
boundary lines that have departed from the legally described route and
clearing titles that have become clouded by ancient, inactive claims.82

B.

Common: Light and Air

Truly common property in land is unknown in American law.
Title to land open to all would be recognized as held by “the people”
in the form of government, state or federal. It is not too much to say
that all land is presumed to be owned by the government unless a
private claimant can prove ownership from a chain of title extending
back to the state or to a recognized adverse possessor.83 Much
government land is held in a form of “public trust,” discussed below.
Also, as discussed later, the federal government holds legal title to
significant amounts of land for the benefit of Native American tribes,
who may occupy it in a form of customary common ownership.
Certain resources necessary for the beneficial enjoyment of land,
such as access to light and air, are by their nature not subject to private
appropriation. Although English common law allowed easements of
light and air appurtenant to a fee simple,84 American courts were
reluctant to recognize them85 because they were concerned about
the antidevelopmental potential of such interests, particularly if

80. Id. at 425.
81. James Charles Smith, Some Preliminary Thoughts on the Law of Neighbors, 39
GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 757, 764 (2011).
82. See id. at 763-64.
83. Cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-79 (2016) (“In all controversies and suits for any land
to which the State or any State agency or its assigns shall be a party, the title to such lands
shall be taken and deemed to be in the State or the State agency or its assigns until the other
party shall show that he has a good and valid title to such lands in himself.”).
84. See 3 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 448 (O.W. Holmes, Jr.
ed., 12th ed. 1873).
85. See id. at 448 n.1. The doctrine of ancient lights “has never . . . been deemed a
part of our law.” Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309, 318 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838).
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acquired by “prescription,” that is, by long continued use.86 Today
environmental regulations often restrict unqualified use of common
elements.87

C.

State/Public: The Public Trust

Approximately one-third of the total area of the United States is
owned by the federal or state governments, although a sizeable
portion of that land is located in Alaska, the largest state, where the
federal government holds title to almost 90% of the land mass.88 Land
owned by the government may be held for public purposes, such as
municipal buildings, parks, or military bases.89 Additionally, the state
may hold title to land used for ordinary proprietary purposes, as to run
a business such as a railroad or to provide a utility such as electricity
or communication services.90 In such cases, the state’s title does not
differ substantially from the title to land held in private ownership. A
significant but unquantifiable portion of government land, particularly
land used for public transportation, is held in a form of public trust.
As explained in James Kent’s classic Commentaries on American Law,
“Every thoroughfare which is used by the public, and is, in the
language of the English books, ‘common to all the king’s subjects,’ is
a highway, whether it be a carriage way, a horse way, a foot way, or a
navigable river.”91 Ocean beaches below the average high tide line are
also generally considered public highways, and as mentioned above,
navigable airspace has been added to the list.92 Land held in public
trust may be subject to restrictions on alienation by the state, which
holds such land for the benefit of the public.93 Whether the state can
alienate land under navigable waters is uncertain. Most commonly it
is possible, although the intention to alienate must be very clearly
expressed.94 Some public land of particular environmental or historic
significance is reserved by state constitutions for preservation and
86. See Parker, 19 Wend. at 318; see also 1 AM. JUR. 2D Adjoining Landowners § 90,
Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2016) (explaining easements of light, air, and view).
87. See Landowner Liability Protections, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/
landowner-liability-protections (last visited Jan. 28, 2017).
88. See Public Land Ownership by State, supra note 48.
89. Merrill, supra note 13, at 733.
90. See, e.g., TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.001 (West 2017) (providing an
example of municipality-owned land for utilities).
91. KENT, supra note 84, at 432.
92. See id. at 426-27, 448-50.
93. See id. at 427.
94. See Gwathmey v. State, 464 S.E.2d 674 (N.C. 1995).
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may be alienated only with the approval of exceptional majorities in
the state legislature.95
In the process of Western expansion, the United States acquired
by conquest or treaty vast amounts of land. Much of that land was
disposed of to settlers at little or no cost under the various Homestead
Acts in the second half of the nineteenth century.96 Of what remains,
some is reserved as national parks, national forests, or wildlife
preserves, while some remains available for sale. 97 Grazing of
privately owned herds on public land has long been permitted.98 At
first, free access was allowed to all ranchers, but this inevitably led to
overuse (the tragedy of the commons), and today pasturage is leased
by the federal government, subject to environmental regulations.99
Since 1975, mining leases on public land have also been granted,
subject to forfeiture if not put into production within ten years.100
While the federal government retains less than 5% of the land east of
the Mississippi River, it retains title to almost half of the land to the
west.101
Although at common law private acquisition of public land by
adverse possession was impossible (Nullum tempus occurit regi),102
many states now permit the practice, usually exempting public
highways and requiring longer adverse occupancy than would be
necessary against a private owner.103 The explanation of the change
probably lies in the historic abundance of land and the public interest
in settlement.

95. See, e.g., N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 5 (discussing the conservation of natural
resources).
96. See, e.g., Act of May 20. 1862, 12 Stat. 392.
97. See Public Land Ownership by State, supra note 48.
98. See Michelman, supra note 29, at 29.
99. 7 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 55.06 (David A. Thomas ed., 2006).
100. Id. § 55.03.
101. See Public Land Ownership by State, supra note 48.
102. BROOM, supra note 75, at 65.
103. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-35 (2016) (providing that adverse possession
against the state gives title after thirty years and twenty-one years in case of possession under
color of title); id. § 1-45 (providing that there is no title by adverse possession of public
ways); see also Lenoir County v. Crabtree, 74 S.E. 105 (N.C. 1912) (holding that adverse
possession is ineffective to confer title to a navigable stream).
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Communitarian: Indian Land104

Native Americans who occupied the territory claimed by
European powers were generally recognized as having some property
rights in their land. 105 North Carolina’s 1776 Constitution, as
mentioned earlier, expressly acknowledged traditional Indian “hunting
grounds” when the newly independent state claimed sovereign
ownership of its territory on behalf of “the people.”106 Acquisition of
title to Indian lands in North Carolina, as elsewhere, could not be
acquired by individual purchasers from Indians or Indian tribes, but
only “by authority of the General Assembly.”107 After the adoption of
the U.S. Constitution in 1789, the federal government entered into
treaties with various Indian nations and assumed legal title to lands
reserved for their occupancy.108 The process was often marked by
coercion and violence and led to the steady reduction in native
populations as the pressure of expanding settlements and a pervasive
sense of cultural superiority resulted in a national policy of forced
Indian removal to Western territories (the Trail of Tears).109 Native
rights were limited to possessory interests; these were progressively
confined to smaller and smaller areas, until today barely 2% of
American land is occupied by the 566 federally recognised tribes.110
The legal status of Indian title was defined by the U.S. Supreme
Court in the leading case of Johnson v. M’Intosh, holding that the
government of the United States “had a clear title to all the lands . . .
subject only to the Indian right of occupancy, and that the exclusive

104. Terminology when discussing indigenous peoples is inevitably problematic.
“Indian” and “tribe,” despite their widespread use in this field, suffer from the stigma of
colonialism. They are used herein only because they frequently appear in statutes, judicial
decisions, and academic literature. For a useful discussion of the topic, see DAVID E.
WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 2007).
105. See FELIX COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.02 (2015),
Lexis (describing principles that dominated European concepts of Indian property rights:
“(1) that Indian peoples had both property rights and the power of a sovereign in their land;
(2) that Indian lands could only be acquired with tribal consent or after a just war against
them; and (3) that acquisition of Indian lands was solely a governmental matter, not to be left
to individual colonists”).
106. N.C. CONST. of 1776, A Declaration of Rights, art. XXV.
107. Id. art. XXXXII.
108. Rights of American Indians Are Protected, TACHI YOKUT TRIBE, https://www.
tachi-yokut-nsn.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/rights_of.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2017).
109. Id.
110. See Public Land Ownership by State, supra note 48.

2017]

THE HONORÉ-WALDRON THESIS

759

power to extinguish that right, was vested in that government.”111 Thus,
although
the original inhabitants . . . . were admitted to be the rightful occupants
of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it,
. . . their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were
necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their
112
own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied.

In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the Supreme Court coined the now
classic phrase to describe the tribes’ legal status: “domestic dependent
nations.”113
From the beginning, there was unease about the place of Indian
nations in a republic committed to Anglo-American legal principles.
As a concurring justice in the Cherokee Nation case put it: “[T]his
state, if it be a state, is still a grade below them all: for not to be able
to alienate without permission of the remainder-man or lord, places
them in a state of feudal dependence.”114 Chief Justice John Marshall,
the author of the opinion of the Court in Johnson, predicted that the
native peoples would eventually “be blended with the[ir]
conquerors.”115 In 1887, in an attempt to speed the assimilation of
Indians into the dominant American culture, Congress adopted the
General Allotment Act, popularly known as the Dawes Act, which
provided for the transfer of fee simple titles, albeit subject to
restrictions, to individual Indians. 116 The result was the further
reduction of tribal land. Over the ensuing generations, fractionation
resulted in uneconomic parcels and the immiseration of many
Indians.117 Eventually the allotment project was abandoned, but forced
assimilation persisted into the last half of the twentieth century. Today,
an attempt to allow native self-determination prevails.118
111. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 585 (1823).
112. Id. at 574.
113. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). Chief Justice
Marshall observed that “[t]he condition of the Indians in relation to the United States is
perhaps unlike that of any other two people in existence.” Id. at 16.
114. Id. at 26-27 (Johnson, J., concurring).
115. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 589.
116. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388 (codified in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).
117. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 712 (1987) (citing, as an example, one Indian
reservation on which “[t]he average tract has 196 owners and the average owner undivided
interests in 14 tracts,” “many of which generate only pennies a year in rent”).
118. See COHEN, supra note 105, § 1.01 (describing six periods of American Indian
history: “(1) Post-Contact and Pre-Constitutional Development (1492-1789); (2) The
Formative Years (1789-1871); (3) Allotment and Assimilation (1871-1928); (4) Indian
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While legal title to the reservations is vested in the federal
government, beneficial ownership is allocated by each tribe according
to its own laws and customs, normally aimed at preserving possession
by enrolled members. For example, the Eastern Band of Cherokee
Indians in the mountains of western North Carolina, descendants of a
group that eluded forced relocation, assigns “possessory holdings” to
individual tribal members.119 The tribe applies state property law,
subject to specific exceptions. For instance, a possessory holder may
alienate the holding only to another enrolled member,120 and failure to
utilize a possessory holding for five years results in “escheat” to the
tribe.121 Because tribal land is deemed essential to the preservation of
tribal identity, Native American tribes, once victims of American
property law, now use it defensively to protect their remaining land.
The tribes purchase adjacent property when possible and transfer legal
title to the federal government to hold for the benefit of the tribe
(land-into-trust program).122
IV. REAL PROPERTY LAW IN AUSTRALIA
As a counterpoint to real property in a legal structure, the
historical trajectory of which represents both continuity and radical
departure from its English law origins, we turn now to Australia,
which shares continuity with the American law in terms of its English
origins, but not in terms of the radical break effected by the American
Revolution. While one’s intuitive sense of the ideal-typic categories
of property in land in the Australian system may closely align with
initial thoughts about the blend found in the United States, we will see
Reorganization (1928-1942); (5) Termination (1943-1961); and (6) Self-Determination and
Self-Governance (1961-present)” (emphasis omitted)).
119. The territory occupied by the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, the Qualla
Boundary, is not technically a federal Indian reservation but land purchased by the tribe in the
1870s and subsequently placed under federal protection. See Ben Oshel Bridgers, An
Historical Analysis of the Legal Status of the North Carolina Cherokees, 58 N.C. L. REV.
1075, 1078-80 (1980).
120. CHEROKEE INDIANS EASTERN BAND, CHEROKEE CODE pt. II, ch. 44A, § 6 (2017),
https://www.municode.com/library/nc/cherokee_indians_eastern_band/codes/code_
of_ordinances?nodeId=PTIICOOR.
121. Id. ch. 47, § 6.
122. Cherokee Nation, BIA Place Largest Area of Land into Trust, CHEROKEE NATION
(Apr. 29, 2016), http://www.cherokee.org/News/Stories/20160429-Cherokee-Nation-BIAplace-largest-area-of-land-into-trust; S.E. Ruckman, Oklahoma Indians Guiding the Way for
Land-into-Trust, INDIAN COUNTRY MEDIA NETWORK (June 21, 2011), https://indiancountry
medianetwork.com/news/oklahoma-indians-guiding-the-way-for-land-into-trust/.
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that the two systems, while similar in some respects, also differ quite
markedly in others.
Intuitive perceptions aside, while the Australian balance of the
conceptual types of property in land clearly tips in favor of private
property in the form of the fee simple title, very significant forms of
state/public and communitarian property can also be found. This Part
first briefly addresses the Australian fee simple and the limited forms
of common property found in Australia, before giving greater
attention to public/state property in what is known as Crown land and
accompanying state leasehold interests and communitarian property
in the form of Native Title.

A. Private: The Australian Fee Simple
The Australian fee simple, and private property in land generally,
mirrors the American system in all but one respect: the place and role
of “the Crown.” In this respect, as we have seen earlier, the American
Revolution effected a major break with the English law that formed
the foundation of and continues to inform the Australian law of
private property in land. The difference today revolves around the
complexities of the English doctrines of tenure and estates, which
posited that the Crown (the state) was the ultimate owner of all
English land through the concept of radical title (a postulate which,
while carrying with it no proprietary status, makes it possible for the
Crown to exercise its role of granting an interest in land to private
persons or groups of them).123 Due to these twin doctrines, it was
always the case, and remains so today, that the ultimate title in English
and Australian land cannot be held, in an allodial sense, by private
persons, natural or legal.124 As T.P. Fry wrote over seventy years ago,
No proprietary right in respect of any Australian land is now, or
ever was, held, by any private individual except as the result of a Crown
grant, lease, or license and upon such conditions and for such periods as
the Crown (either of its own motion or at the discretion of Parliament)
125
is or was prepared to concede.

No private person, then, can be said to “own” land pursuant to
Anglo-Australian law. Rather, through the reception of the English

123. Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 48 (Austl.).
124. See id. at 46-49.
125. T.P. Fry, Land Tenures in Australian Law, 3 RES JUDICATAE 158, 159 (1947).
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doctrines of tenure and estates,126 the Crown grants such estates as
may be possible to such private persons, while retaining the ultimate
right, in the form of reversion to the state through escheat or bona
vacantia (land or a thing with no owner, in other words, where the
holder of an estate is deceased intestate and with no next-of-kin), to
itself.127
It is said, however, that the fee simple is the closest thing to
private allodial ownership due to the possibility of escheat (or bona
vacantia). This residual possibility means that, in effect, the land
remains a form of state or public land to the extent that the ultimate
heir of any person who holds a fee simple is the state. While this is
largely a theoretical possibility, with legislation providing an extensive
list of possible heirs before the state is reached, that possibility
nonetheless exists. In short, the state therefore retains an interest in all
land in Australia, including that held under fee simple, and for that
reason, it can be said that all land is, in fact, state or public property.
The possibility of escheat or bona vacantia notwithstanding, the
fee simple remains the “largest” estate in Australian tenures128—
referring, of course, to the freedom conferred by the title129—and it is
distinguished from other forms of tenure by its inherently unrestricted
heritability and alienation.130 “Fee” refers to an estate that is heritable,
126. The reception of the English law in Australia was settled by the common law and
the Australian Courts Act 1828 (ACT) s 24. See also Mabo, 175 CLR at 34-38 (discussing
the reception of English common law in Australia); Ulla Secher, The Reception of Land Law
into the Australian Colonies Post-Mabo: The Continuity and Recognition Doctrines Revisited
and the Emergence of the Doctrine of Continuity Pro-Tempore, 27 U.N.S.W. L.J. 703 (2004)
(noting that Australian courts have modified English property doctrines).
127. ADRIAN J. BRADBROOK ET AL., AUSTRALIAN REAL PROPERTY LAW 43-47 (5th ed.
2011). The effects of escheat and bona vacantia are largely the same. However, in most
states the land passes to the Crown as bona vacantia rather than the old principle of escheat.
Administration and Probate Act 1929 (ACT) sch 6 (Austl.); Succession Act 2006 (NSW) ch
4, pt 4.5 (Austl.); Administration and Probate Ordinance 1969 (NT) sch 6 (Austl.);
Succession Act 1981 (Qld) sch 2 (Austl.); Administration and Probate Act 1919 (SA) s
72G(e) (Austl.); Intestacy Act 2010 (Tas) pt 5 (Austl.); Administration and Probate Act 1958
(Vic) s 55 (Austl.); cf. Escheat (Procedure) Act 1940 (WA) (Austl.) (“[W]here it appears that
any property has escheated to the Crown . . . the State Solicitor may make application to a
Judge of the Supreme Court for an order declaring that the property concerned has become
the property of the Crown by way of escheat.”).
128. PETER BUTT, LAND LAW 125 (6th ed. 2010).
129. Fee simple title can be held over small stratum and the owner of a fee simple is no
less restricted in their use of the land than an owner in fee tail. John Baalman, The Estate in
Fee Simple, AUSTRALIAN L.J., May 27, 1960, at 3-4.
130. Id. at 3; see Vance, supra note 53, at 266. Whilst the inheritance and alienation of
fee simple titles might be regulated by statute, at common law the fee simple is inherently
without restriction.
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and “simple” to its potential inheritance by anyone, as opposed to a
particular class of heirs131 and its unlimited alienability, inter vivos or
by bequest. Because of these rights, the fee simple is the most
enduring and uninhibited of all of the estates which exist under the
Australian doctrine of tenure,132 and while technically not allodial,
culturally, it enjoys the status of “ownership” of land.133 For that
reason, of the possible tenures which the Crown may grant pursuant to
its radical title, the fee simple estate is the most significant, and the
closest thing to private allodial ownership in Australian land.
The fee simple confers upon its holder significant rights, which
together comprise the bundle of rights or liberal triad reflected in the
liberal conception of private property, and which we see in action in
the fee simple estate, bringing it as close to allodial private ownership
as possible under Australian law. Thus, assuming it is unencumbered
by other possessory or nonpossessory rights, the holder of a fee
simple title enjoys the right to use and possess the land, to the
exclusion of all other people. The holder may exercise those rights so
as to suit personal preference.134 Moreover, the fee simple holder may
remove the land subject to it from the control of the state indefinitely
and even in perpetuity.135 The corollary of this control resides in the
fact that the holder of the fee simple may validly dispose of it inter
vivos, in any way desired, including to sell or otherwise dispose of the
land, in whole or in part, subject to the prohibitions on waste (which
prevent harm to the land for future holders of an estate in that same
land).
The rights conferred by the fee simple survive the death of the
owner and can be bequeathed by will or granted to next of kin.136 In
short, the fee simple can be dealt with according to the wishes or
family ties of the owner to the exclusion of state interests.
The fee simple represents the proprietary interest covering the
greatest expanse of Australian land, comprising 62.75% of the

131. Baalman, supra note 129, at 3. The fee tail, however, can only be inherited by
heirs of a particular sex or in a particular family line. Id.
132. Native title is arguably as enduring, although, as a sui generis interest, it does not
exist as an estate pursuant to the doctrine of tenure.
133. BUTT, supra note 128, at 125.
134. Paul Babie, Sovereignty as Governance: An Organising Theme for Australian
Property Law, 36 U.N.S.W. L.J. 1075, 1076 (2013).
135. See Fejo v Northern Territory (1998) 195 CLR 96 (Austl.).
136. Id. at 105-06.
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Australian land mass.137 Yet, over a third of the Australian land mass is
held pursuant to nonprivate forms of property, to which we now turn.

B.

Common: Light and Air

Due to the impossibility, or virtual impossibility, of creating an
effective right of exclusion vested in any one person (natural or legal),
true common property in the sense that no person or entity holds such
an exclusionary right seldom exists. And those who attempt to elide
this fact by arguing that private property emerged from large-scale
and effective systems of common property are likely either overstating
historical reality or exaggerating small and isolated historical
examples. The reality is that common property represents a largely
theoretical foil in order to explain why private property exists (in other
words, why an exclusionary right exists),138 rather than occupying any
historical priority to the existence of private property.139 Still, some
examples have existed historically and continue to be found in many
legal systems, such as Australia’s.
Australian law recognizes light and air, for instance, being
infinite and uncontrollable, as common property.140 No person can
hold title over them and there exists no restriction on access to them
or regulation of their use.141 In short, they remain a part of the
commons which lies at the heart of the concept of common property.
And they will likely continue this way so long as there remains no
need for a regulatory regime to facilitate their sharing—one’s use of
air or light does not, in most cases, impede another’s similar such use.
Still, it is possible to imagine a future in which that might not be so.
At a time when light and air are becoming increasingly
important due to sustainability considerations in the generation of
electricity,142 it is also increasingly possible to impede access to those

137. Land Tenure, AUSTRALIAN BUREAU STAT. (Jan. 25, 2002, 11:30 AM),
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/0/C4F37E4488D32591CA256B35007ACE07?ope
ndocument.
138. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1246-47
(1968).
139. HARRIS, supra note 5, at 109-18.
140. See AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, ALRC REPORT 129, TRADITIONAL
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS—ENCROACHMENTS BY COMMONWEALTH LAWS, 468-69 (Dec. 2015).
141. See id.
142. BRADBROOK ET AL., supra note 127, at 837-40; Paul Babie, How Property Law
Shapes Our Landscapes, MONASH U. L. REV., 2012, at 1, 17-20.
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resources.143 Urban development, while not rendering light and air
finite, has certainly made it possible to restrict access to them in ways
previously unknown. The placement of solar energy panels or small
wind turbines on the roof of one building can be affected, for instance,
by taller buildings around it. And the traditional remedies for such
interference, such as the torts of trespass or nuisance, may be unable
to address these new circumstances. As such, the law, both common
law and legislation, in this previously unregulated area may need to be
developed in order to create exclusionary rights for and corresponding
enforcement rights to protect this “common property” of light and air.
Although it is not settled at common law,144 the existing private
property easement may be used to modify the existing law relating to
light and air. In 1918 Chief Justice Griffith of the High Court of
Australia acknowledged the possibility of easements to allow passage
of the sun’s rays and the free movement of air.145 Thus, Griffith wrote,
“In the light of modern knowledge . . . there is no difference in
principle between a right to the free passage of moving air to my
windmill and the free passage of running water to my watermill.”146
While the technology may be dated, the kernel of the idea for
modification is there. Indeed, while the creation of an easement for
access to light or air has not yet been tested in Australian law,147 as
reliance on sustainable resources increases, it may become a
ubiquitous part of modern urban regulation.148
The question arises, if such developments occur, whether these
resources continue to be called, in any meaningful way, “common
property.” Whatever the answer to that question may be, for the time
being, this form of property remains a very insignificant one in
Australian law. As such, as between this and private property, the
balance is clearly in the latter’s favor. What, though, of public/state
and communitarian property?

143. For a modern example demonstrating how structures may create such blockages,
see Hunter v. Canary Wharf Ltd. [1997] 2 WLR (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.) 684
(describing case where building blocked television signals).
144. See Allen v Greenwood [1980] 1 Ch. 119.
145. Commonwealth v Registrar of Titles (Vic) (1918) 24 CLR 348, 354 (Austl.).
146. Id.
147. Adrian Bradbrook has, however, advocated for solar easements. See A.J.
Bradbrook, The Development of an Easement of Solar Access, 5 U.N.S.W. L.J. 229 (1982).
148. Babie, supra note 142, at 17-20.
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State/Public: Crown Lands149

At the time of English settlement, Australia appeared to have an
abundance of land, although, as we have also seen, sovereignty itself
did not confer upon the Crown an absolute ownership, but rather a
radical title, and, as we will see, subject to the grant of fees simple, the
existence of native title continued to operate in respect of such
unpatented lands. Nonetheless, the Crown’s radical title allowed it to
grant such lands either pursuant to a fee simple or to other titles, thus
making these lands a vast body of public/state property covering
much of the continent. Known today as “Crown land,” this
public/state property covers public lands comprising approximately
23% of the land mass of the continent, of which 12.5% is vacant
land.150
It did not take the colonial governments of Australia long to
determine a means of parcelling out Crown land to private holders
through a novel form of tenures.151 Yet, rather than a small number of
tenures—which one might have thought likely given the declining
importance of tenure in England—the Australian state breathed new
life into the doctrine in order to make it possible to allow private use
of land while at the same time strictly controlling that use, whatever it
might be. In other words, the Crown’s control over this vast body of
public/state property has been exercised extensively, not only to create
an array of tenures unknown to the English law, but also to create a
new form of private property in those lands. It was an “interplay of
historical, social, and political factors [that] produced [this] unique
and complicated system of tenures in Australia.”152 Thus, “[w]hile the
initial seed of [public/state property in these Australian lands,] planted
in 1788, was the English common law, the subsequent [development
of that system into the fully grown Crown land system was] uniquely
149. This example draws extensively on Fry, supra note 125, and on the longer study,
THOMAS PENBERTHY FRY, FREEHOLD AND LEASEHOLD TENANCIES OF QUEENSLAND LAND
(1946). For a modern Queensland study, see CHRISTOPHER BOGE, STATE LEASEHOLD IN
QUEENSLAND (W.D. Duncan ed., 2000). For a New South Wales study, see ANDREW G.
LANG, CROWN LAND IN NEW SOUTH WALES (1973). For a South Australian study, see Gwen
A. Miller, The Legal History of the Incidents Imposed in Nonfreehold Tenure in South
Australia During the Nineteenth Century (unpublished LLB (Hons.) thesis) (on file with
author). For a Victorian study, see JOHN QUICK, THE HISTORY OF LAND TENURE IN THE
COLONY OF VICTORIA (1883). For a general study, see Paul Theodore Babie, Crown Land in
Australia (2001) (unpublished D. Phil. thesis, University of Oxford) (on file with author).
150. Land Tenure, supra note 137.
151. Babie, supra note 134, at 1076; Fry, supra note 125, at 159-61.
152. Babie, supra note 134, at 1098.
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Australian.”153 T.P. Fry summarized it this way: rights to land are
“derived either directly or indirectly from the [Australian] Crown, or
not at all.”154 Thus, it has never been
possible to gain rights to land in any other way, for example, by
‘squatting’ on it (the one subsequent exception, being, of course, native
title rights). Thus, as we have already seen, the Crown’s sovereignty . . .
was settled rather early on in Australia—it was the power to control the
exercises of rights granted pursuant to the system of land tenure that
155
had developed over time from the initial settlement.

Over time, then, Australian Parliaments created a series of
unique tenures, available only in relation to Crown land, in order to
maximize the benefit of Crown ownership; leases directly from the
Crown, for instance, were and are still common in Australia and can
be subject to a wide variety of conditions, such as payments,
development and maintenance requirements, and restrictions on usage
and alienation.156 This process provides “evidence of a cogent and
administratively enforced policy of making land serve as an
instrument of national and social purposes.”157 This is nothing less
than the history of the Australian Crown’s exercising its radical title
over land to allow the individual to hold power to make use of land,
while at the same time controlling that use so as to protect the
common good. T.P. Fry wrote that:
In the feudal era in England, as also in Australia to-day,
Parliament and the Crown (as advised by the magnates of the realm in
past times and by Cabinet Ministers in modern times) imposed upon
Crown tenants such tenurial incidents as were best calculated to
advance the policies thought at any particular time to be appropriate for
158
the purpose of ensuring the safety and prosperity of the realm.

Four examples assist. First, throughout Australia’s history, stateowned land played a key role in agricultural life and development; this
tenure, which came to be known as the pastoral lease, was invented in
1847.159 Granted first to illegal settlers of Crown land,160 this leasehold
153. Id.; see Australian Courts Act 1828 (ACT) s 24; Mabo v. Queensland [No. 2]
(1992) 175 CLR 1 (Austl.); A-G v Brown (1847) 1 Legge 312 (Austl.).
154. Fry, supra note 125, at 158.
155. Babie, supra note 134, at 1098; see Mabo, 175 CLR 1.
156. Fry, supra note 125, at 165.
157. Id. at 167.
158. Id. at 170.
159. See Babie, supra note 134, at 1099.
160. See id. at 1098-99.
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began life as a license to occupy land on the condition that it be used
for pastoral purposes.161 In 1847, the Crown altered the concept so as
to grant leases directly to pastoralists, on the same condition of
pastoral use.162 This meant the Crown retained the right of resumption,
which would have been lost if a fee simple title had been granted.163
Today, equivalent leases and licenses are granted under State or
Territory Crown land management acts.164
Second, colonial New South Wales used Crown land to control
development through innovative selection tenures, created by statute
in 1868, which were in effect leasehold tenures of agricultural land
capable of being “converted” into freehold tenures through the
performance of certain state-imposed conditions. 165 A common
condition required holders to undertake permanent improvements to
the land and to make annual payments.166 In this way, the state
ensured development of the colony along with a tidy profit, all while
retaining control over the land in a way the fee simple did not.
Third, colonial governments introduced a lasting form of control
through a novel tenure known as the perpetual lease. As is well
known, at common law a lease must be for an ascertainable period;
Crown perpetual leases, however, unless a lessee failed to preform
one of the imposed conditions, endured in perpetuity.167 By creating
leases of this kind, the Crown could retain control over public land.
States and territories today continue to grant such perpetual leases.168
Finally, in addition to the use of Crown land to further the state’s
agenda, the Australian Crown has frequently exercised its power over
public/state property to further the public interest.169 Thus, although
161. Fry, supra note 125, at161.
162. See Babie, supra note 134, at 1099.
163. Id.
164. Planning and Development Act 2007 (ACT) (Austl.); Crown Lands Act 1989
(NSW) (Austl.); Western Lands Act 1901 (NSW) (Austl.); Crown Lands Act 1992 (NT)
(Austl.); Land Act 1994 (Qld) (Austl.); Crown Land Management Act 2009 (SA) (Austl.);
Pastoral Land Management and Conservation Act 1989 (SA) (Austl.); Crown Lands Act
1976 (Tas) (Austl.); Land Act 1958 (Vic) (Austl.); Land Administration Act 1997 (WA)
(Austl.).
165. Fry, supra note 125, at 161.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 167-69.
168. See Pastoral Land Act 1992 (NT) s 48(1)(a) (Austl.); Crown Lands Act 1992
(NT) s 26(b) (Austl.); Western Lands Act 1901 (NSW) s 28A(3)(a) (Austl.); Land Act 1994
(Qld) s 15 (Austl.); Crown Land Management Act 2009 (SA) s 32 (Austl.).
169. See Crown Lands Act 1989 (NSW) ss 87-91 (Austl.) (discussing the power to
reserve land for public use).
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the public has no proprietary right in lands used for public purposes
(such as public highways),170 under Crown lands legislation, the states
and territories may reserve land to be used for a public purpose.171
Effecting such a reservation of land precludes its sale, affording some
protection of public amenities owned by the Crown as public/state
property.172 Similarly, such land can be held by the Crown in trust for
a charitable public purpose.173
Thus, while a large body of Australian land is held by the Crown
as state/public property, it is nonetheless enjoyed by individuals as a
form of quasi-private property, or by the public pursuant to some form
of trust, through the proliferation of these various legislatively created
tenures. The final form of property that is well-represented in
Australian real property law is communitarian, in the form of
Australian native title.

D.

Communitarian: Native Title

As we have seen, “upon the European settlement of Australia in
1788, the continent was regarded as terra nullius [(uninhabited land
without an owner)] and as such,”174 the Crown “settled” the land—as
opposed to acquiring it by either cession or conquest—and the Crown
was thought to have gained unencumbered beneficial title to the land
upon settlement.175 This was the legal position for more than 200
years, “[t]he result of [which] was that the system of land tenures in
operation in Australia was inconsistent with the recognition of any
Indigenous or native title rights to Australian land.”176 Although, as
noted earlier, in 1992, Justice Gerald Brennan acknowledged in Mabo
v. Queensland that:
The common law of this country would perpetuate injustice if it were to
continue to embrace the enlarged notion of terra nullius and to persist in
characterizing the indigenous inhabitants of the Australian colonies as

170. Stow v Mineral Holdings (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. (1979) 180 CLR 295, 311-12 (Austl.).
171. See Crown Lands Act 1989 (NSW) ss 87-91.
172. Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, 132-33.
173. See Brisbane City Council v A-G (Qld) (1978) 19 ALR 681.
174. Babie, supra note 134, at 1095.
175. Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty. Ltd. (1971) 17 FLR 141, 242 (Austl.) (citing Cooper v
Stuart (1889) 14 App Cas 286 (Austl.)); A-G v Brown (1847) 1 Legge 312 (Austl.).
176. Babie, supra note 134, at 1095-96.
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people too low in the scale of social organization to be acknowledged as
177
possessing rights and interests in land.

“The decision went on to recognise the existence of native title in
Australia, a type of beneficial title to land which depends on the
traditional occupation of, or connection with, the land by Indigenous
people.”178
In Mabo, the High Court acknowledged that Indigenous
societies’ customs in relation to land could be recognized as a
preexisting legal system, and that such rights to land under this law
should be recognized and enforced by the common law. 179 The
Crown’s radical title to land was correspondingly subject to native
title.180 The native title rights so found could continue to exist until the
Crown exercised its radical title in a manner inconsistent with the
native title.181 Subsequent legislative enactment and amendment today
ensure that the Crown may no longer extinguish or otherwise interfere
with native title without giving appropriate consideration for taking,
altering, or diminishing the property right so held.182
Native title constitutes the Australian form of the fourth idealtypic category of property identified by Harris: communitarian
property. And today native title comprises fully 14.25% of the
Australian continent.183 Consistent with Harris’ outline of this idealtype, both the external and internal elements of communitarian
property are evident in Australian common law native title. On the
one hand, the common law recognizes, protects, and defines the
geographic scope of native title. Holders of native title must approach
Australian courts (the legal heirs of their invaders) and are expected to
prove their law and custom before they can enforce their rights. On
the other hand, the unique rules, traditions and customs of each
177. Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 58 (Austl.) (emphasis added).
The writings on the decision and its impact are truly voluminous, but for early commentary,
see MABO: A JUDICIAL REVOLUTION—THE ABORIGINAL LAND RIGHTS DECISION AND ITS
IMPACT ON AUSTRALIAN LAW (M.A. Stephenson & Suri Ratnapala eds., 1993) and the
companion volume, MABO: THE NATIVE TITLE LEGISLATION (M.A. Stephenson ed., 1995).
178. Babie, supra note 134, at 1096; see Mabo, 175 CLR at 58. Also, for the
Commonwealth’s legislative response to Mabo, see the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (Austl.)
and the subsequent landmark decision in Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1
(Austl.) (holding that statutory pastoral leases did not extinguish native title rights).
179. Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) pt II div 5 (Austl.).
180. Mabo, 175 CLR at 48.
181. Id. at 69.
182. Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) ss 51, 53 (Austl.).
183. Land Tenure, supra note 137.
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indigenous group determine the content of its native title. Unlike the
tenurial system, native title does not rely on grants of tenure by a
ruling power. It is not the grant of a fee simple upon the sufficient
demonstration of Indigenous connection to the land. Rather, the
recognition of native title exists outside the Australian system of
tenure and is declared to exist, rather than granted existence, by the
Crown.184
Native title rights are, in essence, the recognition by the
Australian state of the legal systems in place prior to European
settlement of the continent. The specific native title rights held by
indigenous claimants are determined solely by reference to the
traditional laws in relation to the land.185 A court therefore engages in
a fact-finding exercise, following the normal rules of evidence for
federal courts,186 in order to determine the existence and extent of the
law and custom. If sufficient evidence of right to the land under
indigenous law is found, and it passes three tests to determine if the
law is “traditional,”187 the court will grant a determination of native
title. At no stage in the process do the Indigenous claimants have to
refer to common law concepts of property in order to make their
claim.
Having considered the two systems in which one has an intuitive
sense of a predominance of private property—the American and the
Australian systems—we turn now to China, a system about which one
might, justifiably, begin with the thought of very near total
domination by state/public property in land. Yet, as we will see, and
as we saw in the case of the American and Australian systems, the
Honoré-Waldron thesis holds true: China’s system is characterized,
just as the American and Australian systems are, by a blend. The only
real difference is one of degree.
184. Currently the Federal Court of Australia has jurisdiction to hear native title claims
and to make determinations as to the existence or nonexistence of native title. Native Title
Act 1993 (Cth) s 13(1) (Austl.). Some novel possibilities for the conversion of Indigenous
land to freehold tenure, however, have recently been introduced in Queensland. See

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land (Providing Freehold) and Other Legislation
Amendment Act 2014 (Qld) (Austl.); Leon Terrill, Converting Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Land in Queensland into Ordinary Freehold 37 SYDNEY L. REV. 519 (2015). This
creates some interesting hybrid possibilities, which, while not the focus of this Article,
demonstrate the flexibility of the boundaries between the four ideal types.
185. See Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 233(1) (Austl.); Mabo, 175 CLR at 88.
186. Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 82(1) (Austl.).
187. Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Cmty. v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422,
444-47 (Austl.).
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REAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINA

As an authoritarian country,188 Chinese property law reinforces
the preeminent role of the state. Emerging from this overarching fact,
what one finds, rather than a comprehensive system of property law,
is a piecemeal system in which the major sources of land law consist
of a number of provisions scattered across various statutes and
administrative orders.189 For that reason, while recognizing the state’s
role in property law, both that law, and the theories which underpin it,
remain relatively young compared to their western counterparts. Still,
it is possible to reveal something about how the system operates.
Chinese law recognizes only two types of land ownership: stateowned and collectively-owned. In addition to these forms of land
ownership, however, an individual may hold a land usage or land use
right;190 while not allodial—existing under a form of tenure—these
rights are the closest that an individual can come to such ownership
within the Chinese system. Given the tensions within the system, and
while there has been extensive reform in recent years, 191 it is
unsurprising that the state, collective, and private rights regimes often
come into conflict and have sparked significant debate concerning the
priority among them.192
This Part briefly considers both the private land use right and the
largely undeveloped area of common real property. It then turns to
the most significant real property rights in China: state and
collectively-owned real property rights.
188. Professor Jacques deLisle correctly writes that “China remains an authoritarian
state. Compared to liberal constitutional democracies, the Chinese regime is much less
fettered by legal constraints on government power and offers its citizens far weaker legal
rights against the state even in ordinary times and absent extraordinary threats.” Jacques
deLisle, Security First? Patterns and Lessons from China’s Use of Law To Address National
Security Threats, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 397, 397-98 (2010).
189. See Chen Huabin (陈华彬), dui wo guo wu quan li fa de ruo gan si kao (对我国物
权立法的若干思考) [Thoughts on Chinese Property Law Legislation], 6 ZHEJIANG SOC. SCI.
[浙江社会科学] 69 (2005).
190. Liang Huixin (梁彗星) & Chen Huabin (陈华彬), wu quan fa (物权法) [Real Right
Law] (5th ed. 2010).
191. See Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, The Numerus Clausus Principle,
Property Customs, and the Emergence of New Property Forms, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2275,
2301-03 (2015); Shitong Qiao, The Evolution of Chinese Property Law: Stick by Stick?, in
PRIVATE LAW IN CHINA AND TAIWAN: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSES 182, 182-83 (Yunchien Chang et al. eds., 2017).
192. See Shang Pingji (单平基) & Peng Chengxin (彭诚信), guo jia suo you quan yan
jiu de min fa zheng dian (国家所有权研究的民法争点) [Civil Law Disputes on State
Ownership], 2 SJTU L. REV. [交大法学] 34 (2015).
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A. Private: The Land Use Right
As we might expect intuitively, private property in land
represents only a small fraction of the landholding in China.
Historically, this was not always the case; not unlike the kings of
England following the Norman Conquest, the feudal emperors of
China held seemingly omnipotent and supreme power in relation to
the ownership of land. As with those medieval kings of England,
private property nonetheless emerged through a form of feudal
governance regime in land ownership rights in many Chinese
dynasties.193 But the revolution and advent of the People’s Republic in
1949 and the first three decades of communist rule brought with it a
series of feverish, radical, and, some have argued, overreaching
political campaigns,194 the centerpiece of which was land ownership.195
The communist system resulted in the wholesale revocation of any
private property rights in Chinese land.196 This pertained until the
emergence of market reforms in the late 1970s and the last thirty
years, during which these early communist changes have come to be
viewed in a different light.197 As such, and in order to reverse some of
the early communist overreach, China has recently reviewed its
attitude towards private real ownership rights. Consequently, this
means that the Chinese system contains private property, albeit of a
limited form.
Following the “open-gate policy” of 1978, ensuring the
transformation of the market economy and the security of foreign
investment, Chinese law has recognized substantial private ownership
rights in a range of resources.198 Still, while allowing a liberalization
of private property rights in other resources, the unique political
193. See, e.g., Chen Qiuyun (陈秋云), song dai zi you di quan fa zhi de li shi yi yi yu
dang dai qi shi (宋代自由地权法制的历史意义与当代启示) [The Historical and Contemporary
Implications of the Free Rights in Land in Song Dynasty] 2 STUDIES IN L. BUS. [法商研究]
154 (2011); Taisu Zhang, Property Rights in Land, Agricultural Capitalism, and the Relative
Decline of Pre-Industrial China, 13 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 129 (2011).
194. See generally Huixin & Huabin, supra note 190 (discussing the history of real
property rights in China).
195. See Wang Liming (王利明) & Zhou Youjun (周友军), lun wo guo nong cun tu di
quan li zhi du de wan shan (论我国农村土地权利制度的完善) [Study on the Legal Institutions
in Land in Village] 1 CHINA LEG. SCI. [中国法学] 45 (2012).
196. Id. The removal of individual property rights may reduce incentives for
individuals; this is believed to be one reason for the massive famine and economic slowdown
that followed the post revolution reforms.
197. See id.
198. See id.
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regime and ideological setting of China means that strong opposition
remains directly to resuscitating private real ownership rights. 199
Within the comprehensive Chinese property rights regime, the only
substantial right missing is the private real ownership right.200 Even
with promulgation of the most recent Chinese property law in 2007,
this Gordian knot continues to puzzle the Chinese legislature, which
remains unsure of the extent to which it should permit private real
ownership.201
Whether one views this knot from the perspective of economic
development or from that of private sector stabilization and security,
the protection of private property rights in land represents a crucial
and unavoidable issue. In order to meet, at least partially, the needs
originating from these twin concerns and to protect private interests in
land,202 during the 1980s, the Chinese legislature introduced the Land
Use Right (Tudi Shiyong Quan), a quasi-real ownership right. This
was followed by the 1988 amendment of the Chinese Constitution in
order to permit the transfer of such an interest in land.203
The land use right places exclusive ownership of land in the
State and special collective organizations, while permitting the holder
of the land use right the use of the land for an ex ante set period,204
during which time the State may not withdraw the use right in absence
of compelling social welfare or national security reasons.205 The right
comprises an absolute right that can exclude all others from the
subject land.206 The regime thereby established allows for mortgage,

199. Chen Xiaojun (陈小君), “Tudi Guanli Fa”xiu gai zhong de bu dong chan wu quan
zhi du (《土地管理法》修改中的不动产物权制度) [The History, Principles and Institutions of
Chinese Land Administrative Law], 5 POL. L. [政治与法律] 2 (2012).
200. Id.
201. Fan Xuefei (范雪飞), si ren suo you quan :suo you quan zhi du de zhi dian (私人
所有权:所有权制度的支点 ) [Private Ownership Right and the Fulcrums of Ownership
Institutions], 29 MOD. L. SCI. [现代法学] 168 (2007).
202. Id.
203. Casey Watters & Charlie Xiao-chuan Weng, Does the Housing Market and

Absence of Consumer Bankruptcy Protection Make Interpretation (III) of the Chinese
Marriage Law Beneficial to Women, Not Men?, 3 CHARLOTTE SCH. L. PROP. L.J. 101 (2016).
204. Zhan Zhongle (湛中乐), wo guo tu di shi yong quan shou hui lei xing hua yan jiu
(我国土地使用权收回类型化研究) [Categorizing Land Use Right Withdrawal Types], 2 CHINA
LEG. SCI. [中国法学] 98 (2012).
205. Id.
206. Zhang Shaopeng (张少鹏), “tu di shi yong quan ”shi du li de bu dong chan wu
quan (“土地使用权”是独立的不动产物权) [The Right to the Use of Land is an Independent
Immovable Property Right], 6 CHINA LEG. SCI. [中国法学] 49 (1998).
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inheritance, alienation, sale, and easements.207 Taking the form of a
contract, a right may be issued for one of five types of land tenure:
(1) residential; (2) industrial; (3) educational, scientific, cultural,
health service, and sport; (4) commercial, tourism, and entertainment;
and (5) mixed.208
Pursuant to the contract which creates the land use right, the
State retains control of the land subject to a land use right through the
imposition of conditions, including the payment of a fee, development
and maintenance requirements, and restrictions on use and alienation
(within the framework of the contract, the holder may freely dispose
of the land use right).209 Whatever the conditions imposed, they are all
aimed toward two objectives: (1) securing the holder’s payment
pursuant to the payment condition, and (2) the efficient use of the
subject land (e.g., education land may not be transferred for
noneducational purposes).
A maximum use period, or term, attaches to each land use
right, 210 with the longest allowable use period not exceeding 70
years.211 Prior to the promulgation of Chinese property law in 2007,
the relevant State Council regulation of 1990 (which created and
regulated the tenure system providing for the term of a land use right)
was silent on the matter of the extension of a term.212 The new law,
however, provides for extension, although the extension conditions
remain elusive, especially for the residential use right.213 While this
207. Chengzhen Guoyou Tudi Shiyongquan Churang He Zhuanrang Zanxing Tiaoli
( 中华人民共和国城镇国有土地使用权出让和转让暂行条例 ) [Interim Regulations of the
People’s Republic of China Concerning the Assignment and Transfer of the Right to Use of
the State-owned Land in the Urban Areas] (promulgated by the St. Council, May 19, 1990,
effective May 19, 1990) (Westlaw China) (official translation).
208. Id. art. 12.
209. Id. arts. 1-54.
210. See id. art. 12. This law stipulates:
The maximum term with respect to the assigned right to the use of the land shall be
determined respectively in the light of the purposes listed below: (1) 70 years for
residential purposes; (2) 50 years for industrial purposes; (3) 50 years for the
purposes of education, science, culture, public health and physical education;
(4) 40 years for commercial, tourist and recreational purposes; and (5) 50 years for
comprehensive utilization or other purposes. Id.
211. Id.
212. See id.
213. A residential land use right can be extended automatically, while the extension
of nonresidential land use rights are subject to administrative discretion. Most scholars
believe that extension should be free of charge. See Huixin & Huabin, supra note 190, at
270-71; Zhonghua Renming Gonghe Guo Wuquan Fa (中华人民共和国物权法) [Property
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Congress, Mar.
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clearly concerns the holder of the right,214 it is not a matter to which
the state devotes much attention, mainly for two reasons: first, the
Chinese government controls the supply of the land use right, and
second, the massive expiration of the first round of land use rights is
at least three decades away.215 From the state perspective, in order to
ensure the maximization of the payment for land use rights, these are
very often issued for the maximum allowable tenure period according
to law.216 Moreover, the lack of effective investment conduits and a
distorted banking system have driven private capital to flood the real
estate market to avoid high inflation rates, and this imbalance between
demand and supply of real property eclipses the title renewal and land
use value discount issues.
From the state perspective, the grant of land use rights for a fee
is currently the primary source of revenue for all levels of the Chinese
government.217 According to the most recent official data, in the past
three years, the state sells approximately 700,000 hectares of land to
private parties per year.218 And there is no questioning the lucrative
nature of these rights. In 2014, the Chinese government derived RMB
3.34 billion ($USD 524 million) through the sale of land use rights (a
quarter less than derived in 2013),219 representing one quarter of the
national budget.220 This only fuels China’s already skyrocketing real
estate prices. Consider Shanghai: in 2014 the average cost per square
16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007) art. 149 (Westlaw China) (official translation); Tudi Dengji
Banfa (土地登记办法) [Measures for Land Registration] (promulgated by the Ministry of
Land and Resources, Dec. 30, 2007, effective Feb. 1, 2008), art. 52 (Westlaw China) (official
translation).
214. Sun Xianzhong (孙宪忠), que ding wo guo wu quan zhong lei yi ji nei rong de
nan dian (确定我国物权种类以及内容的难点) [The Difficulties of Defining Types and Context
of Property Right], 1 LEGAL STUDY [法学研究] 50 (2001).
215. See id.
216. See id.
217. Zhou Gang-zhi (周刚志), di fang “tu di cai zheng " zhi he xian xing kong zhi (地
方“土地财政" 之合宪性控制) [The Constitutional Control of Local “Land Finance”], 1 N. L.
REV. [北方法学] 132 (2014).
218. zi yuan gai kuang (资源概况) [2015 Report], zhong hua ren min gong he guo
guo tu zi yuan bu (中华人民共和国国土资源部) [Ministry of Land & Resource] (2015),
http://www.mlr.gov.cn/zygk/.
219. While this is the official figure, it does not include indirect profit, such as SOE’s
profits through retransferring a land use right previously hoarded. See id.
220. See guan yu 2014nian zhong yang he di fang yu suan zhi hang qing kuang yu
2015nian zhong yang he di fang yu suan cao an de bao gao (关于 2014 年中央和地方预算执行
情况与 2015 年中央和地方预算草案的报告) [Report from the Ministry of Finance on 2014
National Budget], Xinhua She (新华社) [Xinhua News Agency] (2015), http://www.gov.cn/
xinwen/2015-03/17/content_2835417.htm.
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metre of residential property for developers reached RMB 20,000
($USD 3141), most of which represented the cost of land use rights.221
Still, notwithstanding its difficulties, from the private sector
perspective, the land use right represents the only available means for
private parties to obtain land pursuant to a form of private property,
either as an original right from the State or, under limited conditions,
from economic collective organisations. Notwithstanding its obvious
shortcomings as a form of full private real ownership, the land use
right provides a sense of security for private parties during the tenure
of the right,222 which is enough to separate the land use right from
common property under Chinese law.

B.

Common: Unquantifiable Natural Resources

Although infinite and uncontrollable, air, light, and other
unquantifiable natural resources can comprise the subject matter of
property under Chinese law. The Chinese Constitution stipulates that
all natural resources, including air and light, remain the property of
the state. Article 9 provides: “All mineral resources, waters, forests,
mountains, grasslands, unreclaimed land, beaches and other natural
resources are owned by the State, that is, by the whole people, with
the exception of the forests, mountains, grasslands, unreclaimed land
and beaches that are owned by collectives [in accordance with the]
law.”223
In the absence of scarcity of any of these resources, the state
typically refrains from enforcing its paramount right. Moreover, due
to the lack of enforcement, a gap exists in the literature as to the full
nature of the state’s right.224 This, of course, does not mean the
absence of disputes in relation to such resources. With the ongoing
rapid development of real property in China, the right equally to
access common property, such as light and air, has become
221. See qu nian shang hai zhai di lou ban jun1 jia bi jin 2wan da guan chuang li shi
xin gao (去年上海宅地楼板均价逼近 2 万大关 创历史新高) [The Cost of Residential Property
Has Reached RMB 20,000 PSM], Wang Yi (网易) [Net Ease] (2015), http://sh.house.163.
com/15/0109/16/AFHIL7AF00073SDJ.html.
222. Zhang Qianfan (张千帆), cheng shi tu di “guo jia suo you ”de kun huo yu xiao jie
(城市土地“国家所有”的困惑与消解) [The Puzzle and Solution of State-owned Land], 3 CHINA
LEG. SCI. [中国法学] 178 (2012).
223. See XIANFA art. 9 (2004) (China).
224. It is very difficult to imagine that the country can charge foreigners to pay for
inhaling air; it is also difficult to monitor how much air every individual consumes for a costbenefit analysis.
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increasingly important. The proximity of new buildings which block
sunlight, for instance, conflicts with the right to access such light.
Legislative regulation has, as yet, failed to respond to such disputes
which, with increased urbanization, will become more acute.
In order to fill the void left by the positive law, as well as the
academy, Chinese law has borrowed from civilian systems,225 with
Roman law significantly influencing Chinese property law.226 Thus, in
order to efficiently and fairly solve the equal access dispute, Chinese
law employs the civil law principle of adjacent relation (Xianglin
Guanxi ) . The duties required of adjacent relation must therefore
either be stipulated by law or recognized by local custom.227 Similarly,
the Chinese law has borrowed the easement as a form of usufruct
arising under contractual obligation for consideration in order to solve
equal access disputes.228 As with the land use right, however, common
property applies to only a fraction of the land mass of China; by far
the most significant form of property in Chinese land is state or public.
We deal with this in the next section.

C.

State/Public: Public Property Right

In comparison to the small amount of private property in
Chinese land, state/public property constitutes one of the two most
significant forms of landholding in China. Generally, state/public
property or ownership applies to all Chinese land.229 It is therefore
impossible to acquire any interest in Chinese land other than through
the grant of some form of tenure, such as the land use right. In the
absence of these grants, therefore, all land otherwise without a legal
owner is an asset of the state. Indeed, this principle applies to
anything that may be the subject matter of property, real or personal;
Article 113 of the Chinese property law illustrates this point. “A lost
thing shall belong to the State if no one goes to claim it within six
225. See Liu Baoyu (刘保玉), zhong guo wu quan fa de cheng jiu yu bu zu (中国物权
法的成就与不足) [The Achievements and Shortcomings of China Real Right Law], 5 LEGAL
FORUM [法学论坛] 21 (2008).
226. See id.
227. See Zeng Dapeng (曾大鹏), lun xiang lin guan xi de ding yi yu ben zhi (论相邻关
系的定义与本质) [On the Definition and Essence of Neighboring Relation], 37 NANJING U. L.
REV. [南京大学法律评论] 89 (2012).
228. Geng Zuo (耿卓), wo guo di yi quan xian dai fa zhan de ti xi jie du (我国地役权现
代发展的体系解读(我国地役权现代发展的体系解读) [Systematically Deciphering Chinese
Easement Development], 3 CHINA LEG. SCI. [中国法学] 85 (2013).
229. See XIANFA art. 9-10 (2004) (China).
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months from the date the notice of the finding of the thing is
published.”230 Thus, from an economic perspective, state-owned land
comprises a crucial and never-depleted financial resource for multiple
levels of government. Indeed, its prominence as a source of revenue
has grown since the central government curbed the issue of bonds by
local governments as a means of raising revenue.231
The state’s interest in land therefore takes the form of the public
property right. Both extensive and superior to all other proprietary
interests in Chinese land, the public property right operates as the
functional equivalent of allodial ownership, save for the fact that it is
the state itself that holds the interest.232 And it may be applied even to
those lands otherwise held pursuant to the land use right, thus adding
to the lands available for state/public use. As part of the urbanization
process, for instance, the state can, citing compelling social welfare as
its justification, not only withdraw land use rights before the tenure is
due, but also levy collectively owned lands, permanently converting
the subject lands to state-owned land subject to a public property
right.233
The state further controls the use of Chinese land by mandating
that only state-owned land can be used for construction and
development purposes,234 while collective organizations may use their
land only for agricultural and related purposes.235 Thus, in order to
allow for urban development and the use of land subject to the public
property right generally, the state employs two forms of transferring a

230. See Zhonghua Renming Gonghe Guo Wuquan Fa (中华人民共和国物权法)
[Property Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s
Congress, Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007) art. 113 (Westlaw China) (official
translation).
231. See Ma Guangyuan ：hua jie di fang zhai wu wei ji bu neng yi lai tu di cai zheng
(马光远：化解地方债务危机不能依赖土地财政) [Land Finance Is Not the Solution to Local
Debt Crisis], zhong guo jing ji dao bao (中国经济导报) [CHINA ECON. HERALD] (2011),
http://www.ceh.com.cn/ceh/llpd/2011/7/2/81801.shtml.
232. Chen Shujuan (程淑娟), lun wo guo guo jia suo you quan de xing zhi (论我国国家
所有权的性质) [Study the Characteristics of Chinese State-owned Property Right], 1 LAW SCI.
[法律科学] 73 (2009).
233. See Han Yonghong (韩咏红), zhong guo she ke yuan “She Hui Lan Pi Shu”：
qiang zhan nong di shi cheng shi hua zui da tiao zhan (中国社科院《社会蓝皮书》：强占农地
是城市化最大挑战) [The Biggest Challenge of Urbanization Is Illegal Taking Famers’ Lands],
Lian He Zao Bao (联合早报) [ZAOBAO] (2010), http://www.zaobao.com.sg/special/report/
politic/cnpol/story20101216-138111.
234. Huixin & Huabin, supra note 190, at 265.
235. Id.
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usufruct in state-owned land to private parties: land transfer and land
allotment.236 The remainder of this subpart considers each.
1.

Land Transfer

A land transfer arises as a commercial-contractual relationship
between the state and private parties for consideration,237 conferred
subject to a limited term,238 ensuring the state a sustainable financial
resource. At the end of the term of a transfer, the state holds the
power to amend the fee payable from the term of any succeeding
tenure.239
Because the state transfers only a usufruct in land with a limited
term rather than allodial ownership, the issue of the ownership of any
improvements, especially buildings, arises. In this case, a form of the
law of fixtures arises in Chinese property law: during its term, the
ownership of buildings attaches to the land use right held by a private
party.240 At the conclusion of the term, if the state determines the right,
in theory the private owner loses any interest in the building but
remains entitled to reasonable compensation based on market value.241
The most recent regulations, however, fail to directly address this
issue. 242 Moreover, the only regulation that addresses the issue,
promulgated in 1990, in fact stipulates that in such a case, the state
can retain the improvements to the land without providing any
236. See Zhonghua Renming Gonghe Guo Wuquan Fa (中华人民共和国物权法)
[Property Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s
Congress, Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007) art. 137 (Westlaw China) (official
translation); Tudi Guan Li Fa (土地管理法) [Land Administration Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Committee of the Nat’l People’s Congress,
Aug. 28, 2004, effective Aug. 28, 2004) art. 54 (Westlaw China) (official translation);
Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Chengshi Fangdichan Guanli Fa (中华人民共和国城市房地产
管理法) [Urban Real Estate Administration Law] (promulgated by the Standing Committee of
the Nat’l People’s Congress, Aug. 30, 2009) art. 8, 13, 23.
237. Huixin & Huabin, supra note 190, at 267.
238. See Chengzhen Guoyou Tudi Shiyongquan Churang He Zhuanrang Zanxing
Tiaoli (中华人民共和国城镇国有土地使用权出让和转让暂行条例) [Interim Regulations of the
People’s Republic of China Concerning the Assignment and Transfer of the Right to Use of
the State-owned Land in the Urban Areas] (promulgated by the St. Council, May 19, 1990,
effective May 19, 1990) art. 12 (Westlaw China) (official translation).
239. See Tudi Dengji Banfa ( 土地登记办法 ) [Measures for Land Registration]
(promulgated by the Ministry of Land and Resources, Dec. 30, 2007, effective Feb. 1, 2008),
art. 52 (Westlaw China) (official translation).
240. Huixin & Huabin, supra note 190.
241. Yao Ruiguang (姚瑞光), min fa wu quan lun (民法物权论) [Civil Property Law
Study] 166 (1999).
242. Huixin & Huabin, supra note 190.
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compensation. 243 Of course, this seems absurd, even within the
parameters of Chinese public ownership and this loophole will likely
invite future debate about the public ownership right.
2.

Land Allotment

As with the land transfer, the land allotment endures for a
limited term, thus allowing the state a sustainable resource. 244
However, unlike the former, the latter is typically conferred by the
state without taking consideration in exchange.245 And, unlike the land
transfer and its commercial operation, the state retains greater control
over these lands through administrative regulations exercised as a
matter of discretion.
The reality of administrative discretion in relation to the land
allotment carries with it the potential for this form of tenure to operate
as an incubator of corruption and state-owned asset embezzlement.
This is only exacerbated by the fact that the law fails to elaborate the
procedure for and requirements of a land allotment. The China Land
Administrative Law only briefly mentions that public interest
comprises the major criterion to be considered.246
From a land management perspective, the bifurcated land
acquisition system of land transfer and land allotment is efficient; the
former ensures the state’s revenue and control of land use through
zoning, while the latter cuts the costs of public interest projects
making it is easier to launch a project benefitting the social welfare.
Still, the lack of a developed legal system and efficient enforcement
causes ongoing concern and requires the attention of the Chinese
legislature.

D.

Communitarian: Collectively Owned Land

Of course, it is very difficult to find in Chinese history anything
approximating the history of indigenous peoples found in systems
243. See Chengzhen Guoyou Tudi Shiyongquan Churang He Zhuanrang Zanxing
Tiaoli (中华人民共和国城镇国有土地使用权出让和转让暂行条例) [Interim Regulations of the
People’s Republic of China Concerning the Assignment and Transfer of the Right to Use of
the State-owned Land in the Urban Areas] (promulgated by the St. Council, May 19, 1990,
effective May 19, 1990) art. 40 (Westlaw China) (official translation).
244. See id. art. 12.
245. Huixin & Huabin, supra note 190, at 267.
246. See Tudi Guan Li Fa (土地管理法) [Land Administration Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug.
28, 2004, effective Aug. 28, 2004) art. 54 (Westlaw China) (official translation).
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such as the United States and Australia. In a strict sense, there may be
very little if any true communitarian property in Chinese land. Still,
in terms of the area of land covered and the population involved,
Chinese collectively owned property may represent the most
significant form of land ownership in China. The area of land is
almost twenty times larger than that covered by state-owned land on
which construction and development is occurring.247 As of 2014,
about 618 million people live on such land.248 Additionally, for
present purposes, collectively owned land most closely approximates
the definition of communitarian property used in this Article. To
some extent, this imperfect fit may be more a case of the difficulty of
attempting to develop ideal-typic definitions rather than
demonstrating that no such type of land holding exists in Chinese law.
In order to make use of such land, the state divides agricultural
economy units into collective organizations. The Chinese law
provides no workable definition of these organizations;249 about all
that can be said about them is that they may not always be treated as
legal persons,250 and the relevant farmers as a whole own the subject
land as opposed to the organization itself. While academic
commentary makes the case for the equal protection of whatever use
is made of collectively owned land,251 the vagueness of the relevant
law and the fact that this is not an allodial ownership restricts the
functionality of such land in the hands of farmers, as compared to
state-owned land, in three significant ways.
First, collectively owned land can only be used for agricultural
and related purposes, even though the law does not explicitly forbid
otherwise.252 Thus, farmers may, for instance, build a factory to
process the crops harvested, but cannot develop a commercial
residential project on it.253 Article 151 of the Property Law of the
247. See Xinhua She (新华社) [Xinhau News Agency], supra note 220.
248. See 2014nian mo cheng zhen chang zhu ren kou 7.5yi xiang cun chang zhu ren
kou jian shao 1095wan (2014 年末城镇常住人口 7.5 亿 乡村常住人口减少 1095 万) [Report of
the National Statistical Bureau in 2014], Cai Jing Wang (财经网) [CAIJING] (Jan. 20, 2015,
10:27:02), http://economy.caijing.com.cn/20150120/3802875.shtml.
249. See id.
250. Huixin & Huabin, supra note 190, at 129.
251. S Sun Xianzhong (孙宪忠), zai lun wo guo wu quan fa zhong de “yi ti cheng ren
、ping deng bao hu ”yuan ze (再论我国物权法中的“一体承认、平等保护”原则) [Rethink the
Principle of “Recognizing and Equal Protection” in Chinese Property Law], 160 STUDIES IN
L. BUS. [法商研究] 67 (2014).
252. Huixin & Huabin, supra note 190, at 265.
253. Id.
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People’s Republic of China (Zhonghua Renming Gonghe Guo
Wugquan Fa) provides that: “In case a piece of collectively owned
land is used as land for construction, it shall be handled according to
the law on land administration and other relevant laws.”254 The law
surrounding this provision is unclear. On the one hand, except in very
limited situations, the theoretical interpretation of the Tu Di Guanli Fa
treats the law as not permitting use for construction and
development.255 The Chinese Constitution, on the other hand, contains
no such restriction, Article 10 stipulating that:
Land in the cities is owned by the State. Land in the rural and suburban
areas is owned by collectives except for those portions which belong to
the State [in accordance with the] law; house sites and privately farmed
256
plots of cropland and hilly land are also owned by collectives.

Given the lack of clarity on this issue, it comes as no surprise that
disputes arise. An example of this is found in what is known as the
small property right (Xiao Chanquan).257 The overheated real estate
market has enticed collective organizations to join the construction
bandwagon.258 As we have seen, theoretically, collective organizations
may legally build apartments on the land for their members’
accommodation, but cannot seek profit by developing commercial
residential properties. Moreover, the state refuses to recognize and
register the buildings, taking the position that the building works are
illegal as touching the interests of the state.259 Without any form of
recognition, therefore, any such proprietary rights flowing from these
actions are fragile at best, leading to the name “small property right.”
Notwithstanding the lack of security, due to the enormous demand for
accommodation and the resulting profitability derived from meeting
that demand, the small property right is increasingly found in many
provinces in China.260 This draws interesting parallels to other ways in
254. Zhonghua Renming Gonghe Guo Wuquan Fa (中华人民共和国物权法) [Property
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16,
2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007) art. 151 (Westlaw China) (official translation).
255. Liu Jiaan (刘家安), WU QUAN FA LUN (物权法论) [Property Law] 163-64 (2009).
256. XIANFA art. 10 (2004) (China).
257. See Shitong Qiao, Small Property, Big Market: A Focal Point Explanation, 63
AM. J. COMP. L. 197 (2015).
258. See id. at 205-06.
259. See id. at 206.
260. quan guo xiao chan quan fang “fan lan cheng zai ”de bei hou (全国小产权房“泛滥
成灾”的背后) [Rampant Small Property Right], Zhongguo Jingying Wang (中国经营网)
[CHINA BUS. NETWORK] (Jan. 16, 2014, 12:28:42), http://www.cb.com.cn/economy/2014_
0116/1033994.html.
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which parties can provide some form of security in many property
systems in the absence of state/legal sanction.261
Less drastic in terms of the interests involved, the second
restriction involves the substantial weakening of farmers’ financial
capability. The members of a collective organization are entitled to a
piece of land for curtilage; this is known as Zhai Jidi.262 Neither
members nor the collective organization are entitled to alienate this
interest by way of mortgage or sale to anyone outside the
organization.263 While this would be a sensible limitation if its aim
was to keep land within the organization, the law in fact exhaustively
forbids any kind of curtilage transfer to members outside of an
organization, even if such transfers may result in benefit to the
organization.264 Those transfers allowed within an organization are
subject to strict limitations. For instance, if a transferee already holds
an assignment of curtilage, then any attempted transfer of additional
curtilage is invalid.265 While academic authority is clearly on the side
of allowing such minimal transfers, it seems the policy behind the
prohibition on transfers beyond an organization stems from the
concern that such a transfer could be used as security for a mortgage,
which could be enforceable by allowing a nonmember to obtain an
interest in collectively owned land by way of a sale effected by a
lender enforcing its security over the curtilage.266
The final limitation involves those permissible assignments of
agricultural land by means of a land management contract. While this
increases the functionality of such land, as with Zhai Jidi, members
have a very limited ability to transfer that land management right.267

261. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991); SINGER, supra note 9; Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in
Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988).
262. See Zhonghua Renming Gonghe Guo Wuquan Fa (中华人民共和国物权法)
[Property Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007) art. 152-154 (Westlaw China) (official translation).
263. Huixin & Huabin, supra note 190, at 275.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See Zhonghua Renming Gonghe Guo Wuquan Fa (中华人民共和国物权法)
[Property Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007) art. 128 (Westlaw China) (official translation); Tudi
Guan Li Fa (土地管理法) [Land Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 28, 2004, effective
Aug. 28, 2004) art. 2 (Westlaw China) (official translation).
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In most cases, therefore, the transfer of such rights may only occur as
between members of the same organization.
Collectively owned land is, on the one hand, capable of free
utilization by those organizations that hold it, although the rights
which provide for that use remain incomplete. While the revolution
of 1949 took as its main focus the collective holding of land,268 which
resulted in the return of land to the “ownership” of Chinese farmers,
except for working on the soil itself in furtherance of agricultural and
related activities, farmers do not have any further latitude to maximize
the utility of the land.269 The restrictions placed on this form of
landholding leave farmers as the poorest social group in Chinese
society, notwithstanding the value of the resource on which they
live.270 This in turn has resulted in people moving in vast numbers
from agricultural areas to large urban regions when natural disasters
strike. Of course, rather than putting them in a better financial
position, these migrants find themselves working in the lowest paid
jobs.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE HONORÉ-WALDRON CONTINUUM
The Honoré-Waldron thesis posits that one’s intuitive sense of a
predominant ideal-typic category of property in land tends not to
withstand an assessment of the reality of a working legal system. Put
another way, an assessment of a legal system’s real property law belies
our intuitive sense of the predominant category of property in that
system. Rather, what one finds is not the complete absence of any
one of the four ideal-typic categories of property in a working legal
system, but a blend of those four types. The only difference between
systems will always be one of degree. Thus, each system considered
in this article demonstrates some invocation of the concept of private
property in land. In the United States and Australia (both common
law systems), this takes the form of the fee simple which, as we have
seen, itself is very similar in the two systems, save for the role of the
people in the United States and the Crown in Australia, while in China
(a civilian system) it is found in the Land Use Right. And each
system has some implementation of state/public property. In the
United States, this occurs in the case of the public trust, while in
268. Liming & Youjun, supra note 195.
269. See Shitong Qiao, The Politics of Chinese Land: Partial Reform, Vested Interests,
and Small Property, 29 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 70, 76-77 (2015).
270. See id. at 102-03.
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Australia it is through Crown lands, both very similar means of
dealing with public land but, again, with the people in the case of the
former standing in contrast to the Crown in the case of the latter
marking an important substantive difference. In China, of course, this
form of property predominates in the Public Property Right.
All three systems place very little weight on the existence of
common property, either theoretically, in the case of the United States
and Australia, or practically, in the case of China (although common
resources such as light and air are treated somewhat differently in
China than they are in the United States and Australia); this is to be
expected given the theoretically narrow category that this term
encompasses.
Perhaps communitarian property represents the most difficult
category. Both the United States and Australia clearly accommodate
this form of property in tribal lands and native title, respectively.
China represents the limiting case; we have characterized collectively
held land as communitarian property. This may or may not be correct,
but that characterization does not affect the validity of the HonoréWaldron thesis, which only posits a blend of the ideal-typic categories.
We have found that there is such a blend in each of the systems
considered.
We have tested this thesis through an assessment of the real
property systems of three dominant systems, representing both the
common and civilian legal traditions, each the subject of a common
intuitive understanding of the type of property one might find there:
the United States, a common law system, the intuitive sense of which
is one of private property; Australia, also a common law system, with
an intuitive sense of its being largely a system of private property; and
China, a civilian system with a strong intuitive presumption of
state/public property. It is true that the intuitive sense is largely borne
out by our analysis, but the Honoré-Waldron thesis also tells us—
indeed, this is its important insight—that while this may be true, one
will always find a blend of types. The difference, as we have noted, is
always a matter of degree. Such is the case in each of the jurisdictions
considered here.
What we propose, given that every system of land law will
normally be structured around the private-state/public polar opposites,
is that the Honoré-Waldron thesis requires us to begin by placing any
legal system’s real property structure on a continuum based upon our
intuitive/theoretical sense of the place and role of either private or
state/public property in that system. We can call this the Honoré-
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Waldron Continuum I (Intuitive/Theoretical), represented in
Diagram 1. At one end of the continuum is the intuitive/theoretical
presumption of a system dominated by private property. Clearly, the
United States sits at this position on the continuum. At the other end
is a strong intuitive/theoretical presumption of state/public property,
which is where China sits. And between those two poles we can place
Australia—for convenience we have placed it in the middle. However,
those initial placements are not intended to indicate the reality of the
system.
Diagram 1
Honoré-Waldron Continuum I
(Intuitive/Theoretical)

Indeed, what we have found is that, in the actual operation of the
systems of real property examined, the United States sits somewhat
closer to the middle of the continuum, where we might think of a
roughly equal blend of private and state/public property. China, too,
sits closer to the middle than we might intuitively expect. But both
are still on the private and state/public ends of the continuum,
respectively. Australia, based upon its actual blend, likely sits closer
to the United States, and certainly on that end of the continuum, as
opposed to its intuitive placement roughly in the middle. In other
words, as predicted by the Honoré-Waldron thesis, our
intuitive/theoretical assumptions about a system do not coincide with
its operation in practice. Put another way, the actual content of idealtypic property types in each system places all three closer to the
middle of the continuum than our intuition would otherwise dictate.
For this reason, a second continuum must run parallel to the first,
on the basis of the actual blend of ideal-typic categories: the more
state/public property in a system for which is held an
intuitive/theoretical presumption of private property moves that
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system closer to the centre of the continuum in the direction of
state/public property. And the more private property in a system for
which is held an intuitive/theoretical presumption of state/public
property moves that system closer to the centre of the continuum in
the direction of private property. This requires a second form of the
continuum, which we call the Honoré-Waldron Continuum II (Actual),
represented in Diagram 2.
Diagram 2
The Honoré-Waldron Continuum II
(Actual)

Our intent is to show that the Honoré-Waldron thesis will be of
value in characterizing the real property systems, and indeed, of any
type of property system, in any given nation, under either a common
or civilian legal system; this will, in turn, assist in understanding the
operation of the system, as well as making clear that no one system is
a monolith. Every system of property, in other words, contains a
blend of the ideal-typic categories. While our analysis is limited to
three jurisdictions, our hope is that future research will bear out the
Honoré-Waldron thesis, both in terms of systems of property in
alternative resources, such as intellectual property, and in relation to
other national jurisdictions, both common law and civilian.

